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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Upon taking office in January 2009, one of President Obama’s first official acts
was to issue an executive order requiring that all persons detained by the United States be
treated humanely, and that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) close all of its
detention facilities.1 Together with another executive order directing the closure of the
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay,2 this order marks the beginning of the end of a
controversial chapter of American counterterrorism policy.
At this time, the beginning of a new presidency, it is instructive to look back at the
period just past, a period in which torture and coercion were openly sanctioned as tools of
interrogation at the highest levels of the Bush administration.3 This article is about the
normalization of interrogational torture and coercion from 2001 to 2008. In particular, the
discussion focuses on a key device in the normalization process: the ticking bomb
scenario. Long a philosophy professor’s staple, the ticking bomb scenario post-9/11
received renewed attention from legal academics, who have invoked it in questioning the
status of the absolute legal prohibition on torture. Versions of the ticking bomb scenario
have also appeared in Bush administration documents and official statements that
asserted the legality of torture and various coercive interrogation techniques.
Additionally, the scenario has been replicated in the media and popular culture, the most
notable example being Fox’s high-rating television show, 24. Together, these various
manifestations of the ticking bomb scenario constitute the first narrative or account of
torture.
However, this narrative has been contested by a second account of torture that
challenges the logic of the ticking bomb scenario. Academic commentators have
highlighted the assumptions underlying the scenario that render it a suspect guide to
policy. Certain government actors, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and military lawyers, consistently rejected its logic, and opposed the use of torture
and coercion in interrogation. This second account also has a popular culture
*

Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. My thanks to An Hertogen and Kevin Jon Heller,
for their comments on earlier drafts. Any errors remain my own.
1
Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf.
2
Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf. See also Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene
Cooper, Obama Reverses Key Bush Policy, but Questions on Detainees Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009,
at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23obama.html?_r=1.
3
This typically involved an official admission that a particular coercive interrogation technique had been
used, while at the same time denying that the use of that technique amounted to torture. This pattern of
admission and denial is illustrated by the Bush administration’s defense of waterboarding. See infra text
accompanying notes 84-85.
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representative in the form of Sci-Fi Channel’s Battlestar Galactica. Thus, the same battles
that have been fought over the treatment of detainees in the “war on terror” in the legal
and political arenas by real world actors in the years since 9/11 have also been fought at a
discursive level in popular culture.
The article begins in Part I by laying out the law in relation to torture. The law in
this area is clear: torture and various other forms of mistreatment are illegal. However,
soon after 9/11, there were calls to loosen the reins and allow counterterrorist agencies
greater flexibility. Parts II and III discuss the two narratives of torture identified above,
and particularly their appearances in academic literature, official discourse, and popular
culture. If the previous two parts consider how art has imitated life, Part IV deals with
how life has imitated art. The popular culture representatives of each narrative, 24 and
Battlestar Galactica, are reflections of post-9/11 American society. At the same time,
both shows have the potential to shape and influence the debate about torture in the
United States. 24, in particular, being representative of the dominant or hegemonic
narrative of torture during the period under consideration, has already done this in several
different ways.
I. THE NEW NORMAL

¶5

¶6

The prohibition on torture features prominently in international law. It is widely
accepted as a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).4 The right to be free
from torture can also be found in numerous human rights treaties. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, states that “[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”5 The
Covenant permits derogation from certain rights during exceptional situations of
emergency, but the right to be free from torture is not one of these rights.6 The
Convention against Torture (CAT) further clarifies this point in unequivocal terms: “No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture.”7 The CAT, in addition to prohibiting torture,8 also obliges states to take
measures to prevent acts, which, although falling short of the threshold for torture,
nevertheless amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”9
The law of armed conflict protects against torture and coercion as well. The
prohibition on torture here can be found as far back as the Lieber Code of 1863.10 It also
4

See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, paras. 33-34.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
6
Id. art. 4.
7
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
8
CAT defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Id. art. 1.
9
Id. art. 16.
10
See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Order No. 100
5
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finds expression in the more recent Geneva Conventions. For example, article 17 of the
Third Geneva Convention states, “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatsoever.”11 It further states that prisoners of war who refuse to answer questions
“may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.”12 Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that “[n]o
physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to
obtain information from them or from third parties.”13 Both the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions explicitly state that torture is a grave breach of the Conventions.14
Additionally, common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which appears in all four
Conventions, protects against “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.”15 Finally, Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which applies as a backstop to detainees who are
not entitled to more favorable treatment under the Conventions or the Protocol, prohibits
“torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental.”16
In terms of domestic law, the prohibition on the infliction of torture has long been
considered a touchstone of the common law.17 Torture is plainly prohibited under
American law as well. The general criminal law would apply to acts amounting to torture
committed inside the United States.18 Further, the Torture Statute, enacted by Congress in
order to implement obligations under CAT, criminalizes acts of torture committed outside
the United States.19 Moreover, prior to changes wrought by the Military Commissions
(Apr. 24, 1863), art. 16, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
11
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII].
12
Id.
13
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 31, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308.
14
See id. art. 147; GCIII, supra note 11, art. 130.
15
GCIII, supra note 11, art. 3. Although applicable on its terms to “armed conflict not of an international
character,” common article 3 also states the minimum protection applicable to international armed conflicts
as a matter of customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-15, paras. 218-20 (June 27); see also George H. Aldrich,
The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT‘L L. 42, 60 (2000); Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War
on Terror, 32 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS 193, 230 (2002).
16
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M.
1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Although the United States has not ratified the two Additional Protocols of
1977, article 75 of Protocol I is applicable as the United States accepts that it is declaratory of customary
international law. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (citing William H. Taft IV, The Law
of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
17
See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, para. 11 (“[F]rom
its earliest days the common law of England set its face firmly against the use of torture.”).
18
Michael Garcia, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation
Techniques, CRS Rep. for Congress, at CRS-8 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32438.pdf.
19
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000):
§ 2340. Definitions
As used in this chapter-(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control;
(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from—
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Act of 2006,20 the War Crimes Act of 1996 made it a serious criminal offense for anyone,
whether inside or outside the United States, to commit either grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions or breaches of common article 3.21
This impressive edifice of legal prohibitions came under pressure soon after the
September 11 attacks as the notion that “9/11 changed everything” gradually became
conventional wisdom.22 In this new reality, basic commitments to certain values, even the
right to be free from torture and coercion, were called into question. In the face of an
apparently novel societal threat, adherence to the old rules was seen as being
characteristic of a naïve pre-9/11 mindset. And thus, what was previously unthinkable
was no longer so: torture and its close cousins would once again be on the discussion
table as an instrument of state. This change was exemplified by Vice President Cheney,

(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality; and
(3) “United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States.
§ 2340A. Torture
(a) Offense.--Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this
subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if-(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged
offender.
(c) Conspiracy.--A person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same
penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the conspiracy.
The definition of torture in the Torture Statute is narrower than that of CAT. This reflects the reservations,
understandings and declarations attached by the Senate during the ratification process. See U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17,486-01 (1990), also available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm. The flexibility afforded by the Torture
Statute’s narrower definition was later exploited by the Bush administration. See infra text accompanying notes 62-69.
See also John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 54), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265124.
20

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601-02 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§948a).
21
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §2441 (2000). The Military Commissions Act narrowed the War Crimes
Act’s coverage from breaches of common article 3 to specified “grave” breaches of common article 3. See
James G. Stewart, The Military Commissions Act’s Inconsistency with the Geneva Conventions: An
Overview, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 26, 33 (2005).
22
Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks at McChord Air Force Base (Dec. 22, 2003), transcript
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031223-1.html (“In a
sense, 9/11 changed everything for us.”); President George W. Bush, Press Conference (Sept. 23, 2004),
transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/200409238.html (“See, 9/11 changed everything.”); see also Daniel Henninger, Wonder Land: 20th Century Rules
Will Not Win A 21st Century War, WALL S. J., Apr. 7, 2006, at A12.
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who ominously spoke of “hav[ing] to work . . . sort of the dark side” soon after the
attacks.23
¶9
Those closer to the counterterrorism coalface seemed to take this tough talk from
above to heart. As one anonymous official involved in the capture and transfer of terrorist
detainees stated, “If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you
probably aren’t doing your job.”24 The same official also opined that the CIA had for too
long promoted a “view of zero tolerance” on torture.25 Cofer Black, Director of the CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center from 1999 until 2002, summed up this brave new world of
interrogation in his Congressional testimony: “All I want to say is that there was ‘before
9/11’ and ‘after 9/11’. After 9/11 the gloves came off.”26
¶10
The end result was that torture and coercion became acceptable or at least tolerable
to some degree. As John Parry suggests, elite opposition to the excesses of American
counterterrorism policy, particularly in relation to the (mis)treatment of detainees, did not
translate into similar opposition from the general public.27 David Luban agrees, observing
a new tolerance for torture, at least when inflicted on terrorists.28 He notes the lack of
public outrage upon the disclosure of the CIA’s torturing of high-value al Qaeda
detainees, and the disinterest of the American media in the torture of al Qaeda leader
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the disappearing of his two sons.29 Even official
admissions in 2008 that the United States had subjected three high-value detainees to a
form of torture known as waterboarding met with a similarly apathetic public response.30
This state of affairs was encapsulated by Mark Danner’s 2005 remark: “[t]he system of
torture has . . . survived its disclosure.”31

23

Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (remarks of Vice President Richard Cheney),
transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20010916.html.
24
Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2002, at A01.
25
Id.
26
Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 56.
27
John T. Parry, ‘Just for Fun’: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L.
& POL'Y 253, 282 (2005).
28
David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Bomb 2-3 (Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1154202),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154202 (“[T]he American public has become decidedly tolerant of
torture, provided that the subjects are described as terrorists.”); see also Will Lester, Most Say Torture OK
in Rare Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/06/AR2005120600110.html (noting that 61 percent of Americans surveyed
agreed that torture was justified at least on rare occasions; by comparison, almost 90 percent of respondents
in South Korea and about half of respondents in France and Britain agreed).
29
Luban, supra note 28, at 3.
30
See Richard Esposito & Jason Ryan, CIA Chief: We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=4244423; Poll results: Waterboarding is Torture, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/06/waterboard.poll/index.html (noting that 69 percent of
respondents agreed that waterboarding was a form of torture, and that 40 percent of respondents agreed that
the U.S. government should be allowed to use waterboarding for interrogation) (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
See generally Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007).
31
Mark Danner, We Are All Torturers Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 2005, at A27.
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II. ART IMITATES LIFE: TICKING BOMBS AND 24
¶11

At the heart of the rise of this tolerance for torture was the ticking bomb scenario.
Typically, this scenario posits that terrorists have planted a bomb in a major city that is
due to detonate in a relatively short and finite period of time. If the bomb explodes, a
large number of people will be killed. Authorities have, however, captured one of the
terrorists, who has critical information that would allow authorities to defuse the bomb.
The terrorist, however, refuses to talk, leaving the interrogator with the unenviable choice
of either allowing the bomb to explode or obtaining the information through torture.
¶12
The ticking bomb scenario is, as Luban observes, “a remarkably effective
propaganda device. . . . [I]t is simple, easy to grasp, emotionally powerful, and—above
all—it seems to have only one right answer, the pro-torture answer.”32 In addition to its
one-sidedness, the ticking bomb scenario is pervasive in discussions about torture and
coercion:33
It is a remarkable fact that everyone argues the pros and cons of torture
through the ticking time bomb. Senator Schumer and Professor
Dershowitz, the Israeli Supreme Court, indeed every journalist devoting a
think-piece to the unpleasant question of torture, begins with the ticking
time bomb and ends there as well.34
¶13

The ticking bomb scenario’s ubiquity extends to academic discussions about
torture, as well as documents and official statements from the Bush administration
concerning the interrogation of terrorist suspects. It is also the leitmotif of Fox’s
counterterrorism drama, 24. These varied sources constitute a consistent narrative about
torture centered on the ticking bomb. The underlying message is clear: torture is an
effective and sometimes necessary tool for extracting crucial, lifesaving information.
A. The academic debate over torture and the ticking bomb

¶14

The debate here has generally not been whether torture is an evil, but whether, in
spite of this, torture could under certain circumstances be a necessary or lesser evil.35
Invariably, the device used to dislodge all but a hardy few deontologists from the
absolutist no-torture-ever position was the ticking bomb scenario.
¶15
The use of the ticking bomb scenario in the context of torture was not entirely new.
Jeremy Bentham constructed a version of it in the early nineteenth century.36 Michael
Walzer discussed it in 1973.37 It also appeared in several law review articles written

32

Luban, supra note 28, at 4.
Id.
34
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 44
(Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006).
35
For a useful description of the debate, see Sherry F. Colb, Why is Torture 'Different' and How 'Different'
is it? 7-14 (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 08-171), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099061.
36
See W. L. Twining & P. E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L. Q. 305, 347 (1973).
37
Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 160, 167
(1973).
33
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before the September 11 attacks.38 But after 9/11, the ticking bomb scenario acquired a
new salience. Journalists began posing the ticking bomb scenario in discussions about
whether torture should now be permissible.39 The academic debate followed suit. Faced
with the scenario, few academic commentators maintained the position that torture should
be prohibited absolutely and under all circumstances.40 Most argued that torture could be
justified in certain exceptional circumstances. However, there were differing views as to
what this entailed for the interrogator in the ticking bomb scenario and for the absolute
legal prohibition on torture. Some adhered to the absolute legal prohibition for pragmatic
reasons, and found some ex post means of dealing with the interrogator faced with a
ticking bomb.41 Parry, for example, argues that an interrogator who had truly resorted to
torture as a last resort to save lives would have access to the criminal law defense of
necessity.42 Oren Gross, the foremost exponent of this view, advocates official
disobedience and, where appropriate, ex post ratification. Thus, an interrogator who
tortured would violate the law, but it would then be up to society to decide how to
respond. The interrogator might be subject to sanction if society regarded the
interrogator’s action as unjustifiable or inexcusable. Conversely, societal ratification
might occur by utilizing measures such as prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, or
executive clemency.43
¶16
Others, seeking to de-moralize the issue of torture, were less attached to the
absolute legal prohibition on torture, and advocated a more transparent ex ante approach
that accommodated a ticking bomb situation. This included the most notable academic
proponent for the use of torture since September 11, Alan Dershowitz.44 Dershowitz
38

See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, The State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 345 (1989);
Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 333-34 (1989); Winfried
Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses From German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661,
677 (2000). See also Gunter Frankenberg, Torture and Taboo: An Essay Comparing Paradigms of
Organized Cruelty, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 404-5 (2008) (noting various discussions of torture in German
legal literature before September 11, 2001).
39
Vicki Haddock, The Unspeakable, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2001, at D1 (“The strongest argument for
rougher interrogations of those now custody [sic] is that getting them to talk, by whatever means, might foil
future attacks—possibly even a cataclysmic assault with a biochemical weapon or radioactive ‘dirty bomb’
that could kill tens of thousands of Americans.”); Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/76304 (“Israeli law leaves a little
room for ‘moderate physical pressure’ in what are called ‘ticking time bomb’ cases, where extracting
information is essential to saving hundreds of lives.”). See also Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into
Discussion By News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 5, 2001, at C1.
40
Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 231,
238-39 (2006) (“So I now take the most moderate position on torture, the position nearest to the middle of
the road, feasible in the real world: never again. Never, ever, exactly as international law indisputably
requires.”); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence and the White House, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1681, 1714-15 (2005) (“Might we be willing to allow the authorization of torture at least in a
‘ticking bomb’ case . . . ? For what it is worth, my own answer to this question is a simple ‘No.’ I draw the
line at torture.”). See also Ariel Dorfman, The Tyranny of Terror: Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century and
Beyond?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 3 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
41
See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 145 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of
the Law, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 229 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Kadish, supra note 38.
42
Parry, supra note 41, at 158.
43
Gross, supra note 41, at 240-41.
44
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002). Dershowitz also sets out his position on torture
in various newspaper columns. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//courses01/rrtw/Dershowitz.htm
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argues that since torture sometimes works, the use of torture in interrogation is a moral
dilemma that must be faced.45 Dershowitz accepts that in the case of a ticking bomb
torture is justified on utilitarian grounds: “[I]t is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on
one guilty terrorist than to permit a large number of victims to die.”46 His suggested
methods for inflicting pain are a sterilized needle under the fingernails, or a dental drill
into an unanaesthetized tooth.47
¶17
Dershowitz further suggests that the infliction of pain should be regulated by a
system of judicial warrants in order to minimize the instances of torture. Under this
system, an executive official would present evidence to a judge that a suspect had
information needed to thwart an impending terrorist attack. Assuming that the judge
granted the warrant, the suspect would then be granted immunity and told that he was
compelled to testify. If the suspect refused, he would then be threatened with torture, and
if necessary, subjected to non-lethal torture, as authorized by the warrant.48 Dershowitz
contends that torture is inevitable in a ticking bomb situation; the only question is
whether it is going to be done openly or secretly and illegally.49 His position is that his
system of judicial torture warrants will enhance the transparency and accountability of
torture, and therefore limit its occurrence to truly exceptional cases.50
¶18
Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke go further than Dershowitz, who is opposed to
torture as a general moral matter.51 They argue that “torture is indeed morally defensible,
not just pragmatically desirable.”52 In their view, torture is morally justifiable on
utilitarian grounds, namely “when more grave harm can be avoided by using torture as an
interrogation device.”53 They then proceed to set up their version of the ticking bomb
scenario.54 Bagaric and Clarke conclude that the absolute prohibition against torture is
(“[T]orture in general certainly shocks the conscience of most civilized nations. But what if it were limited
to the rare ‘ticking bomb’ case--the situation in which a captured terrorist who knows of an imminent largescale threat refuses to disclose it? Would torturing one guilty terrorist to prevent the deaths of a thousand
innocent civilians shock the conscience of all decent people?”); Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to torture? Get
a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19 (“The Israeli Supreme Court left open the possibility,
however, that in an actual ‘ticking bomb’ case—a situation in which a terrorist refused to divulge
information necessary to defuse a bomb that was about to kill hundreds of innocent civilians—an agent
who employed physical pressure could defend himself against criminal charges by invoking ‘the law of
necessity.’ No such case has arisen since this court decision, despite numerous instances of terrorism in that
troubled part of the world. Nor has there ever been a ticking bomb case in this country. But inevitably one
will arise, and we should be prepared to confront it. It is important that a decision be made in advance of an
actual ticking bomb case about how we should deal with this inevitable situation.”).
45
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 44, at 137.
46
Id. at 144.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 158-59.
49
Id. at 151.
50
Id. at 158-59.
51
Alan M. Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 257, 266 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
2004).
52
Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which
Torture is Morally Justifiable 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (2005). A similarly enthusiastic view is put
forward by columnist Charles Krauthammer, who sets up the ticking bomb scenario where the choice is to
torture or have one million people die: “Not only is it permissible to hang this miscreant by his thumbs. It is
a moral duty.” See Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 5,
2005, at 21, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/400rhqav.asp.
53
Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 52, at 583.
54
Id. (“Consider the following example: A terrorist network has activated a large bomb on one of hundreds
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untenable, and that a legal framework that sanctions the use of torture in certain
exceptional circumstances should be devised.55
¶19
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule also argue for the legalization and regulation of
what they term “coercive interrogation,” a label that encompasses torture as well as cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment.56 In their view, there is nothing exceptional about
coercive interrogation, meaning that it should be dealt with like any other coercive state
practice. Consequently, they recommend subjecting coercive interrogation to ex ante
legal regulation, which would include Dershowitz-style warrants.57 In the course of their
argument, they also invoke the ticking bomb scenario to overcome the absolute
deontological position.58
B. The ticking bomb scenario in official discourse
¶20

The invocation of the ticking bomb was not limited to academics. Versions of it
became a part of the official discourse on torture; the ticking bomb scenario can be found
in various memoranda concerning the treatment of detainees, as well as in official
statements made by various members of the Bush administration on the same issue. An
early memorandum, attributed to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales but reportedly
the work of long-time Cheney aide, David Addington,59 set the tone for the
administration’s treatment of detainees in the “war on terror.” It asserted that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to either the conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban, a view that
President Bush subsequently would largely endorse.60 Elements of the ticking bomb
scenario are immediately apparent:
As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war… The
nature of the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as the
ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their
sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians…
In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict
of commercial planes carrying over three hundred passengers that is flying somewhere in the world at any
point in time. The bomb is set to explode in thirty minutes. The leader of the terrorist organization
announces this intent via a statement on the Internet. He states that the bomb was planted by one of his
colleagues at one of the major airports in the world in the past few hours. No details are provided regarding
the location of the plane where the bomb is located. Unbeknown to him, he was under police surveillance
and is immediately apprehended by police. The terrorist leader refuses to answer any questions of the
police, declaring that the passengers must die and will do so shortly.”).
55
Id. at 616.
56
ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 184 (2007).
57
Id. at 185.
58
Id. at 187 (“One might hold that coercive interrogation is absolutely impermissible, as a violation of
rights rooted in human dignity or autonomy. This position is held by a very few moral philosophers. Here,
the ticking-bomb hypotheticals are important: while it is possible to argue that such cases are so rare that
they should be ignored by a rule-consequentialist calculus ex ante, an argument we consider below, it is
fanatical to argue on deontological grounds that rights against coercive interrogation should not be
overridden to prevent serious harms to others.”).
59
JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 124 (2008).
60
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, the Sec’y of State, the Sec’y of
Def., et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7 2002), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Bush 2-7-02.pdf (stating that GCIII did not apply to the
conflict with al Qaeda and that, although GCIII did apply to the conflict with the Taliban, the Taliban
detainees did not satisfy the requirements for prisoner of war status).
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limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of
its provisions.61
¶21

The ticking bomb scenario is also evident in the most infamous of the Bush
administration’s “torture memos,”62 the Bybee memorandum.63 This memorandum was
written because of the concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about the
legality of its interrogators’ actions. Soon after 9/11, the CIA had been given a broad
mandate to track down, detain and kill certain terrorists.64 Thus began the High-Value
Detainee (HVD) program.65 The CIA subsequently interrogated a number of high-level al
Qaeda operatives using various coercive interrogation techniques. CIA officials disagreed
about the propriety of such techniques: some thought more latitude was appropriate,
while others were concerned about potential legal exposure.66 The CIA consequently
sought clarification from the Department of Justice. This led to internal discussions
amongst high-level decision-makers, and eventually the creation of the Bybee
memorandum of August 2002,67 now widely acknowledged to be the work of John
Yoo,68 which tendentiously interpreted its way around the Torture Statute69 by various
means. In the course of a discussion about the potential availability of the criminal law
defense of necessity to an interrogator, the ticking bomb scenario appears:
[A] detainee may possess information that could enable the United States
to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11
attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an
interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided
by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of
lives.70

¶22

Around the same time, military commanders at Guantánamo Bay were under
pressure to obtain more intelligence from their captives. This eventually resulted in a
push to loosen the restrictions on the use of coercive interrogation techniques.71 The
61

Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to the President of the United States, Decision Re
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban
(Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf.
62
A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMOGUIDE.html.
63
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 41 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
64
Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/08/13/070813fa_fact_mayer.
65
Parl. Assem. of the Council of Eur. [PACE], Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, Secret
Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council Of Europe Member States: Second Report,
¶¶ 51-71, AS/Jur (2007) 36 (June 7, 2007), available at
http://www.bernan.com/images/PDF/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf.
66
ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 120-21 (2006).
67
Id. at 121.
68
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 142 (2007).
69
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000).
70
Bybee Memo, supra note 63, at 40-41.
71
See infra text accompanying notes 188-192.
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military leadership at Guantánamo sought and obtained high-level authorization: in
December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the use of certain additional
interrogation techniques such as forced standing.72 This and other coercive techniques
were used on Mohamed al-Qahtani, one of several possible 20th September 11
hijackers.73 However, in January 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his earlier
authorization, and convened a special Defense Department Working Group to consider
the issue of interrogation. The final Working Group memorandum authorized the use of
most of the same techniques that had earlier been authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld.74
These included techniques euphemistically described as “environmental manipulation”
and “reversing sleep cycles from night to day” and “isolation.”75 The ticking bomb
scenario appears once again in relation to the necessity defense:
According to public and governmental reports, al Qaeda has other sleeper
cells within the United States that may be planning similar attacks [to
9/11]. Indeed, al Qaeda’s plans apparently include efforts to develop and
deploy chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could
enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or
surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm
that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance
compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could
take hundreds or thousands of lives.76
¶23

In September 2006, just prior to the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, President
Bush requested that Congress enact legislation to authorize military commissions to try
terrorists.77 In the course of this speech, President Bush revealed that a small number of
terrorist suspects had been detained and interrogated outside the United States by the
CIA.78 This was the first official acknowledgement of the CIA’s HVD program and its
72

MCCOY, supra note 66, at 127.
Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, June 12, 2005, at 26,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071284,00.html. A Bush administration
official, Susan Crawford, later concluded that al-Qahtani had been tortured. See Bob Woodward, Detainee
Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1.
74
MCCOY, supra note 66, at 128-29.
75
Id. at 129.
76
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 26 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf; see also Memorandum from John
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Military
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 62 (March 14, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc-interrogation.pdf (“So, if officials had credible threat
information that a U.S. city was to be the target of a large-scale terrorist attack a month from now and the
detainee was in a position to have information that could lead to the thwarting of that attack, physical
contact such as shoving or slapping the detainee clearly would not be disproportionate to the threat posed.
In such an instance, those conducting the interrogations would have acted in good faith rather than
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”).
77
Congress would eventually accede to this request. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 20.
78
President George W. Bush, Discussing Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists
(Sept. 6, 2006), transcript available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
73
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associated “black sites,” interrogation facilities located at various places around the
world.79 President Bush also defended the CIA’s use of “an alternative set of
procedures”80 for interrogating the high-value al Qaeda detainees in the familiar terms of
the ticking bomb scenario. He emphasized the success of these alternative procedures in
broad terms, but adhered to the position that the United States did not engage in torture:
these alternative procedures, while tough, were “safe, and lawful, and necessary.”81 The
CIA’s special program was necessary because these detainees were “dangerous men with
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new attacks.”
Accordingly, it was imperative that CIA agents have the operational flexibility to unlock
these men’s secrets: “The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on
our ability to learn what these terrorists know.”82 Even though he stated that there were
no longer any detainees in the HVD program, President Bush reserved the right to start it
up again if the need arose:
[W]e will continue working to collect the vital intelligence we need to
protect our country. . . . But as more high-ranking terrorists are captured,
the need to obtain intelligence from them will remain critical—and having
a CIA program for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to
getting life-saving information.83
¶24

Similarly, in 2008, when CIA director Michael Hayden admitted before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence that three high-value terrorist detainees had been
subjected to waterboarding,84 he justified the use of this technique by alluding to the
ticking bomb scenario. In his view, waterboarding could be justifiably employed if “an
unlawful combatant is possessing information that would help us prevent catastrophic
loss of life of Americans or their allies.”85
79

The story was originally broken in 2005. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. For an account of life at a black site, see Mark Benjamin, Inside the
CIA’s Notorious “Black Sites,” SALON.COM, Dec. 15, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/12/14/bashmilah.
80
The euphemism “alternative set of procedures,” like its post-9/11 variants “torture lite,” “moderate
physical pressure,” “enhanced interrogation” and “highly coercive interrogation” are reminiscent of earlier
euphemisms for torture, such as the Nazis’ “sharpened interrogation,” and the “pushed interrogation” of the
French in Algeria. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 358 (2007).
81
President Bush, supra note 78. Given what is known about the interrogation practices of the CIA’s HVD
program, these assertions of legality strain credulity. See JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 31-32 (2006)
(describing various interrogation techniques such as confinement in confined boxes, sleep deprivation,
sensory deprivation, stress positions and water-boarding, and noting that CIA officials familiar with the
interrogations of high-value al Qaeda detainees have “no doubts in their minds that the CIA is torturing its
prisoners.”). See also Mayer, supra note 64 (describing the use of similar techniques, and quoting an expert
as saying that the CIA’s interrogation program is “one of the most sophisticated, refined programs of
torture ever”); MAYER, supra note 59, at 272-78 (discussing the interrogation techniques used on Khalid
Sheik Mohammed).
82
President Bush, supra note 78.
83
Id.
84
This was the first such public admission by a high-ranking intelligence official. See Richard Esposito &
Jason Ryan, CIA Chief: We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=4244423.
85
Terry Freiden, CIA Director: Waterboarding Necessary, but Potentially Illegal, CNN.COM, Feb. 7, 2008,
available at http://a.findtarget.com/CNN.php?/2008/POLITICS/02/07/mukasey.waterboarding/index.html.
See also Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1,
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In sum, the logic and rhetoric of the ticking bomb scenario features strongly and
consistently in this official discourse; those being interrogated are dangerous men with
information about grave threats to national security. In order to save lives, that
information needs to be extracted by any means necessary.
C. The Ticking Bombs of 24

¶26

Perhaps the most recognizable standard-bearer for life-saving torture from 2001 to
2008 has been the fictional Jack Bauer, hero of Fox’s highly successful drama 24.86 Bauer
personifies the idea that effective counterterrorism requires the freedom to do whatever is
necessary to ensure national security, including torture. Each season of 24 tracks a single
twenty-four hour day with Bauer and his fellow agents at the fictional Counterterrorist
Unit (CTU), who must protect the nation from various terrorist threats. The urgency and
tension of the show is emphasized by its distinctive narrative device of a real-time digital
clock that counts down each hour at the beginning and end of each episode, and after
each commercial break.87 Inevitably, in the course of a season of 24, Bauer forcibly
interrogates various people connected to the terrorist plot for critical information. Almost
invariably, these people divulge that information, allowing Bauer to eventually foil the
terrorists’ nefarious plans.
¶27
Popular depictions of the ticking bomb scenario are not new. For example, Darius
Rejali notes that such stories have been told in many television programs, and novels
such as Jean Lartéguy’s Les Centurions, which includes a scene where a French soldier in
Algeria tortures a dentist-cum-terrorist and forces him to reveal the location of 15 bombs
that he has set to explode the next morning.88 Likewise, Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, a
maverick cop with little patience for bureaucratic niceties, was willing to torture when
circumstances required it. In the eponymous 1971 film, Eastwood’s character faces a
situation similar to the ticking bomb scenario: he tortures Scorpio, a serial killer, in order
to discover the location of a kidnapped child before she dies. He succeeds in extracting
the information, but the girl is already dead. To rub salt in the wound, Scorpio is released
because of the unlawful nature of Dirty Harry’s tactics.89
¶28
Given the news and discussion about torture after 9/11, there was an air of
inevitability about torture becoming a dramatic device—a form of entertainment.90 But
available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01/04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_ban/ (discussing
a senior administration official’s comments that President Bush intended to reserve the right to violate the
prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment contained in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005), in exceptional situations such as a ticking bomb scenario).
86
Alessandra Stanley, Bombers Strike, and America Is in Turmoil. It’s Just Another Day for Jack Bauer,
N.Y. TIMES, January 12, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/arts/television/12twen.html (noting that the steady increase in the
show’s ratings since 2001).
87
See Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer.
88
REJALI, supra note 80, at 545-47.
89
DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. Studios 1971). See also Uwe Steinhoff, Torture —The Case for Dirty
Harry and Against Alan Dershowitz, 23 J. OF APPLIED PHIL. 337 (2006). This particular scenario has an
eerie similarity to the real life case involving Frankfurt Police Vice-President Wolfgang Daschner. See
Florian Jessberger, Bad Torture—Good Torture?, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1059 (2005).
90
Scott Horton, How Hollywood Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Ticking) Bomb, HARPERS, March
1, 2008, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2008/03/hbc-90002531 (“The entertainment industry latches
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24, which first aired in November 2001, around the time that Alan Dershowitz began
speaking of ticking bombs and torture warrants,91 has taken the depiction of torture to a
new level. Of course, in accordance with the ticking bomb scenario that the show
wholeheartedly embraces, Bauer (and sometimes his CTU colleagues) torture only in
order to uncover critical information that will forestall disaster and save lives. But given
the frequency of ticking bombs in 24—indeed, the show might aptly be described as a
series of ticking bomb situations contained within a season long ticking bomb scenario—
graphic scenes of interrogational torture are frequent92 and have become a hallmark of the
show. The characteristics of 24’s depiction of torture are discussed further below.93
1. Torture is Always a Response to an Urgent Threat
¶29

Jack Bauer only tortures when compelled to by extreme exigency. Unlike some of
the evil forces in 24 (terrorists, the Chinese government), who torture sadistically or
gratuitously, Bauer only tortures for the purposes of eliciting life-saving information.94
For example, in season 2, Bauer interrogates Syed Ali, the terrorist leader involved in an
attempt to detonate a nuclear bomb in Los Angeles. Ali refuses to give up any
information. Bauer has Ali’s son executed while Ali watches over a video-link, and
threatens to execute the other. Ali finally relents and reveals the location of the bomb and
key details of the plot. It is revealed later in the episode that in fact Bauer only staged the
executions over the video-link.95
¶30
Similarly, in season 4, Sarah Gavin, a CTU employee, is framed by a mole in the
agency, leading CTU to believe that she knows the location of a device that will halt the
impending meltdown of several nuclear reactors. Erin O’Driscoll, the head of CTU
demands that Gavin reveal the location of the device, emphasizing that “thousands of
people’s lives are at stake.”96 Faced with Gavin’s unresponsiveness and impending
disaster, O’Driscoll orders that Gavin be tortured even as she expresses some doubt over
Gavin’s guilt. Gavin is repeatedly shocked with a taser, and injected with a pain-inducing
drug.97
¶31
In the same season, Bauer suspects that his love interest’s ex-husband, Paul Raines,
is connected to the same terrorist plot to cause multiple nuclear reactors to melt down,
on to the events of the day and tries to take a ride from them. That is the simple nature of things.”).
91
See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 19,
available at http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//courses01/rrtw/Dershowitz.htm; see also PHILIPPE SANDS,
TORTURE TEAM 64 (2008).
92
Horton, supra note 90 (noting 67 torture scenes in 24’s first five seasons); Adam Green, Normalizing
Torture, One Rollicking Hour At a Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 2, at 34; Matt Feeney, Torture
Chamber, SLATE, Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2093269/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). See also
Christopher J. Patrick & Deborah L. Patrick, The Third Degree, in JACK BAUER FOR PRESIDENT 87, 98-99
(Richard Miniter ed., 2008).
93
See generally Tung Yin, Jack Bauer Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law, 17 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 279 (2008) (considering 24’s depiction of torture and Arab villains).
94
Sam Kamin, How the War on Terror May Affect Domestic Interrogations: The 24 Effect, 10 CHAP. L.
REV. 693, 708 (2007); James R. Silkenat & Peter M. Norman, Jack Bauer and the Rule of Law: The Case
of Extraordinary Rendition, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 535, 546 (2007) (“In the show, there are only hours or
even minutes left to find the one crucial piece of intelligence. In reality, detainees are often tortured for
months, without reference to any specific terrorist plot.”).
95
24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003).
96
24: Day 4: 2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 7, 2005).
97
Id.
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because he owns a building used to plan an earlier terrorist attack that day. Bauer subjects
Raines to improvisational electroshock torture with a live electrical wire pulled out of a
hotel lamp. Bauer justifies his torture of Raines by emphasizing how he does not have
time to obtain the information any other way, and that he has to find out what Raines, at
this stage an uncooperative suspect, knows about the terrorist plot.98
2. Torture Rapidly Generates Important Intelligence Information
In the world of 24, torture swiftly yields critical intelligence.99 In almost all cases, it
goes without saying that Bauer or his colleagues have before them a factually guilty
terrorist, or at least someone complicit in the terrorist plot.100 Moreover, as Sam Kamin
notes, “The imposition of torture on a suspect invariably and almost instantaneously
forces the suspect to speak and to speak truthfully about what she knows.”101 While the
effectiveness of torture as an empirical matter is a highly contested issue,102 one would
never comprehend this from watching 24, where torture reveals critical information at a
breakneck pace almost without fail. For example, Paul Raines is initially defiant, and has
nothing to say in the face of Bauer’s questions. However, several electric shocks quickly
persuade him to check the business records on his laptop more closely. As Bauer
ominously dangles the live wires near his cheek, Raines uncovers an important link to
terrorist mastermind Habib Marwan.103
¶33
In season 2, National Security Advisor Roger Stanton is revealed to be a traitor,
and is interrogated about the location of a nuclear device that is to be detonated in Los
Angeles. A Secret Service agent puts his feet in a bucket of water and electrocutes him
with a defibrillator.104 In the next episode, Stanton’s interrogation continues as the
President watches on; “Everyone breaks eventually,” he observes.105 Stanton manages to
hold out for longer than most of 24’s villains, but eventually discloses information in the
following episode.106 Indeed, seemingly the only exception to the rule that everyone
breaks eventually is Jack Bauer himself. As he is returned by the Chinese government
after a long period of detention and torture in season 6, a Chinese official remarks, with
apparent grudging admiration, that Bauer never broke his silence.107
¶34
For Joel Surnow, the co-creator and executive producer of 24, torture is more than a
just a dramatic device; he clearly believes in the efficacy of torture as an article of faith.108

¶32

98

24: Day 4: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 28, 2005).
Silkenat & Norman, supra note 94, at 547. This is denied, however, by at least one of the show’s writers.
See James Surowiecki, The Worst Day Ever, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2134395/fr/rss/.
100
Sarah Gavin’s torture in season 4 is a notable exception. However, as Tung Yin observes, Bauer himself
is never wrong. See Yin, supra note 93, at 284-85.
101
Kamin, supra note 94, at 706-07; see also Yin, supra note 93, at 285.
102
See infra text accompanying notes 133-160.
103
24: Day 4: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m., supra note 98.
104
24: Day 2: 6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 4, 2003).
105
24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003).
106
24: Day 2: 8:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 18, 2003).
107
24: Day 6: 6:00 a.m. - 7:00 a.m. (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007).
108
See Mayer, supra note 87 (quoting Surnow as saying, “We’ve had all of these torture experts come by
recently, and they say, ‘You don’t realize how many people are affected by this. Be careful.’ They say
torture doesn’t work. But I don’t believe that.”). John Yoo, author of many of the Bush administration’s
memoranda concerning the war on terrorism, has a similar view about the use of torture and coercion. See
99
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By contrast, Douglas Johnson, the Executive Director of the Center for the Victims of
Torture, testified to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that torture does not swiftly
elicit information. It is a time-consuming process, and the information elicited is often
unreliable.109 Thus, the instant efficacy of torture as depicted on 24, where “Jack Bauer
seems successfully to torture someone to extract crucial national security information
from one commercial break to the next” bears little relation to the reality of torture.110
3. There are Few Adverse Consequences for the Torture Victim
¶35

Victims of torture in 24 often recover quickly and experience no long-term adverse
effects. They may even cooperate and work with the person or agency that has just
finished torturing them. Their experience of torture is, it seems, quite transitory.111 For
example, Paul Raines, just hours after being electrocuted by Bauer, assists his former
torturer by using his computer database expertise to recover files from terrorist Habib
Marwan’s workplace computer.112 Later Raines helps Bauer fight off a team of
mercenaries, and even takes a bullet for Bauer (which eventually kills him).113 Similarly,
Sarah Gavin willingly goes back to work for CTU after a brief period of recovery in the
infirmary. Soon after returning to her workstation, she even has the presence of mind to
request that O’Driscoll have her arrest expunged from her record and give her a pay raise
as compensation for being wrongfully tortured.114
¶36
As Claudia Card observes, “The FOX network television serial drama ‘24,’ . . .
does real torture victims a disservice by sanitizing torture and presenting victims as
bouncing back from it the next day, as though it were no worse than a painful tooth
extraction.”115 Such swift and miraculous recoveries from torture, of course, are not
reflective of the experience of actual torture victims, who may—in addition to any
ongoing physical effects—experience serious psychological and emotional problems such
as memory loss, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder.116
4. Summary: Just leave it to Jack
¶37

24 epitomizes the dominant ticking bomb-centered narrative about torture.117 The
clock is counting down and time is running out; with its omniscient view, the audience
MAYER, supra note 59, at 134 (quoting Yoo as saying, “It works—we know it does. The CIA says it does
and the Vice President says it does.”).
109
Hearing on the Nomination of The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United
States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 154–56 (2005) (testimony of Douglas A.
Johnson, Executive Director, The Ctr. for Victims of Torture), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1345&wit_id=3939 (“Although eventually everyone
will confess to something, it takes a lot of time.”). See also infra text accompanying notes 133-160.
110
Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1164 (2005).
111
Silkenat & Norman, supra note 94, at 549.
112
24: Day 4: 6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast March 7, 2005).
113
24: Day 4: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast March 14, 2005); 24: Day 4: 2:00 a.m. 3:00 a.m. (FOX television broadcast May 2, 2005).
114
24: Day 4: 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 21, 2005).
115
Claudia Card, Ticking Bombs and Interrogations, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 9 (2008).
116
See Testimony of Douglas A. Johnson, supra note 109 (detailing the serious longer-term effects on
victims of torture). See also JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE 169-183 (2000).
117
The fictional nature of the ticking bomb scenario is acknowledged by one of the show’s co-creators,
Bob Cochran. See Clive Thompson, Cruel Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005 (Magazine), available at
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knows the person about to be tortured has some vital clue, and that absent heroic
intervention, nuclear incineration (or some equivalent horror) awaits.118 The only hope of
discovering the critical clue necessary to thwart the terrorist attack is someone like Jack
Bauer, who is willing to torture when necessary.
¶38
Season 4’s torture of Joe Prado, a man connected to the season’s uber-villain
Marwan, offers perhaps the paradigmatic depiction of torture in 24.119 Prado is captured
by CTU, but his interrogation is delayed after Marwan notifies the human rights
organization, Amnesty Global, that CTU is planning to torture an innocent man.120 Just as
CTU agents are about to inject Prado with some type of drug, David Weiss, an attorney
from Amnesty Global, shows up at CTU—protective court order in hand—and halts
Prado’s interrogation.121 Weiss remains unmoved by appeals from various members of
CTU, who argue that many lives depend on finding out what Prado knows. The President
of the United States, meanwhile, is unwilling to authorize Prado’s torture without
consulting the Justice Department. Bauer takes matters into his own hands by resigning
from CTU, and torturing the critical information about Marwan out of Prado as a private
citizen.122
¶39
The audience knows that Prado is involved with Marwan, but CTU is unable to
uncover this information because Weiss, the Amnesty Global lawyer, intervenes to
protect Prado’s legal rights. The audience also knows that Amnesty Global was tipped off
by Marwan himself, making both Weiss and Amnesty Global unwitting agents of
“lawfare.”123 Additionally, the President is gun-shy, and unwilling to act without
bureaucratic cover. But in spite of all these obstacles, Bauer once again saves the day
with torture.124 The unapologetic message of this episode, and by extension the show, is
that torture works, that torture is necessary,125 and that rather being a tool of dictators and
http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/tv/10966/.
118
See See Yin, supra note 93, at 285.
119
Cf. Brett Chandler Patterson, “I Despise You for Making Me Do This,” in JACK BAUER FOR PRESIDENT
29, 37-38 (Richard Miniter ed., 2008).
120
As Adam Green observes, the message in this episode is clearly that “those seeking to protect suspects’
rights risk abetting terrorist activities, to catastrophic ends.” See Green, supra note 92. A similar sentiment
was expressed by real-life Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Charles Stimson. In
a radio interview, Stimson identified several law firms acting for terrorist detainees and suggested that
those firms’ corporate clients should make the firms “choose between lucrative retainers and representing
terrorists.” See Neil Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, January 13, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html.
121
24: Day 4: 12:00 a.m. - 1:00 a.m. (FOX television broadcast April 18, 2005).
122
Id.
123
“Lawfare” denotes the use of legal processes as a means of achieving a military advantage. See David
Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2020 (2008); see also National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 5 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm (“Our strength as a nation
state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora,
judicial processes, and terrorism.”).
124
In season 7 of 24, Bauer faces a tough reception before a Senate hearing investigating his use of torture.
Despite also facing the prospect of criminal charges, Bauer offers an unapologetic defense of his actions.
His primary inquisitor is a meddlesome Senator Blaine Mayer, presumably a fictional stand-in for reporter
Jane Mayer of the New Yorker. See 24: Day 7: 8:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. (FOX television broadcast Jan. 11,
2009).
125
See Alessandra Stanley, Bombers Strike, and America Is in Turmoil. It’s Just Another Day for Jack
Bauer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/arts/television/12twen.html.
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tyrants, torture is an act of rebellious heroism.126 Those who would stop Jack Bauer from
doing his job—smug liberals, spineless politicians, and dangerously naïve human rights
groups—are to be viewed with contempt. What the real Jack Bauers of the world need is
the unfettered discretion to protect national security.127
III. ART IMITATES LIFE: SKEPTICISM ABOUT TORTURE AND BATTLESTAR GALACTICA
¶40

Overall, the first narrative of torture described above proved dominant for most of
the duration of the Bush administration. But it was, and is, subject to challenge by the
second and alternative narrative of torture, which challenges the validity of the first
narrative’s centerpiece, the ticking bomb scenario, by highlighting how it obscures
several important assumptions—most significantly, that torture is actually effective—and
how it ignores the long-run costs of torture.
¶41
Resistance to the first narrative was particularly pronounced in the academic arena,
where academic commentators vigorously contested the validity of the ticking bomb
scenario. Even where the first narrative arguably achieved its greatest dominance,
amongst government actors, there was dissent from some, most notably the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and military lawyers. At the level of popular culture, SciFi’s Battlestar Galactica portrays the use of torture and coercion ambiguously, and, as
will be argued below, skeptically. Battlestar Galactica’s account of torture thus forms an
interesting counterpoint to the ticking bombs and moral certainty of 24.
A. Academic Counterarguments to the Ticking Bomb Scenario
¶42

Although Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal probably attracted the most
attention, he was by no means the only—nor indeed the most enthusiastic—advocate of
interrogational torture and coercion. His torture warrant proposal may be faulted on the
basis that it will not achieve his professed goal of minimizing torture.128 But a more
fundamental critique can be made of Dershowitz’s position, and by extension others who
rely on the ticking bomb scenario to undermine the absolute prohibition on torture. Like
the economist trapped on the desert island with a can of food who, according to the wellworn joke, simply assumes a can-opener, the ticking bomb scenario assumes away all the
difficulties and untidiness of reality.
¶43
As Luban has thoroughly demonstrated, the ticking bomb scenario depends on a
series of assumptions,129 of which four are particularly important. The scenario assumes:
first, that the interrogator knows that disaster is imminent unless he or she acts; second,
that the interrogator has the terrorist who has the requisite knowledge; third, that torturing

126

See Teresa Wiltz, Torture’s Tortured Cultural Roots, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at C1 (observing the
shift towards torture by heroes rather than just villains). Notably, Alan Dershowitz’s torture warrant
proposal does not appear to have been taken up in 24. See Alan M. Dershowitz, 24 and the Use of Torture
to Obtain Preventive Intelligence, in JACK BAUER FOR PRESIDENT 103,105 (Richard Miniter ed., 2008).
127
See Horton, supra note 90; Stanley, supra note 125. In many ways, this is simply an extension of the
idea of an individual hero (typically a police officer) having to battle criminals as well as “the system.”
This is a staple of fictional accounts of policing. See generally RAY SURETTE MEDIA, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3rd ed. 2007).
128
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 44, at 158-59.
129
Luban, supra note 28, at 7-8.

52

Vol. 7:1]

John Ip

the terrorist (and nothing else) will reveal the critical information; and fourth, that we are
dealing with a one-off situation. These assumptions are examined further below.
1. Disaster is Imminent
¶44

The ticking bomb scenario conveniently stipulates that authorities know that a
bomb is ticking somewhere; typically, the interrogator knows that terrorists have planted
a bomb in a major city that will detonate with catastrophic consequences in several hours.
But reality rarely, if ever, presents such black and white situations. Even if one accepts
that the United States is engaged in a war on terrorism, and is faced with an ongoing
terrorist threat, the decision of whether to use torture will in all likelihood have to be
made under a much more uncertain set of circumstances.130
2. The Captive is the Terrorist Bomber

¶45

A further built-in assumption is that authorities have actually captured the right
person: “it is built into the hypothetical that he is a terrorist.”131 This conveniently
eliminates any concerns that authorities might have the wrong person, and be at risk of
torturing an innocent. Even if the captive is not the actual bomber, at the very least, it is
taken for granted that the captive is part of the terrorist plot, and has enough information
that, if revealed, would allow authorities to prevent disaster. However, in reality, things
are unlikely to work out so neatly: a captured member of al Qaeda, for example, may not
know the relevant details of the terrorist plot because of the polycentric structure of the
organization.132
3. Torture Works

¶46

Additionally, the ticking bomb scenario crucially assumes that torture works.
Whether something “works” logically presupposes a yardstick for determining success.
In the case of interrogational torture, success must be the eliciting of relevant and truthful
information from the person interrogated.133 So the claim that torture works is the claim
that torture not only makes people talk, but makes them speak the truth. The evidence put
forward by the advocates of interrogational torture, however, is sketchy at best.134
Dershowitz, for instance, claims that torture sometimes works, and that there are
“numerous instances” to substantiate this claim.135 But only one example, the
interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad, actually appears in the text.136 In 1995, Philippine
police arrested Murad and brutally tortured him in various ways for sixty-seven days. On
Dershowitz’s account, Murad, under torture, confessed to various plots, including a plan

130

Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 285,
306 (2005).
131
Shue, supra note 40, at 233.
132
Scheppele, supra note 130, at 306.
133
Id.
134
See generally Philip N.S. Rumney, Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective? A
Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 479 (2006).
135
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 44, at 137.
136
Id.
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to crash eleven commercial airliners into the ocean.137 However, the Murad case has been
thoroughly debunked. In reality, even though police had broken his ribs, burned him, and
pumped his stomach with water for more than two months (by which time any ticking
bombs would surely have detonated), Murad did not speak. For whatever reason, Murad
only spoke when a new team of interrogators turned up claiming to be Mossad agents
with the task of taking him to Israel.138 Moreover, Murad was captured with a treasure
trove of incriminating evidence, including a manual for making liquid bombs, fake
passports, and a computer. Once decrypted, files on the computer revealed the same
information about these various terrorist plots.139
¶47
Posner and Vermeule cite evidence from Israel that they admit is “anecdotal or
impressionistic.”140 However, they conclude that this evidence nonetheless “strongly
suggests that coercive interrogation saves lives.”141 At most, what one could safely
conclude is that coercive interrogation may have been successful in those particular
instances, and even that conclusion is not unproblematic.142 In any case, this evidence
does not demonstrate that coercive interrogation is generally an effective means of
eliciting life-saving truth, or that the “claim that coercive interrogation is ineffective is a
delusion.”143
¶48
Bagaric and Clarke make a similarly sweeping claim about the effectiveness of
torture on the basis of limited evidence. They put forward one example before concluding
that torture “is an excellent means of gathering information.”144 Their example concerns
the actions of Frankfurt Police Vice-President Wolfgang Daschner. On Daschner’s
instructions, a police officer told a captured child kidnapper that police would inflict pain
on him that “he would never forget” unless he revealed the kidnapped child’s location.145
After hearing this threat, the kidnapper revealed the location of the child, who tragically
was already dead.146 This episode certainly appears to be an instance where threatened
torture was able to elicit the truth. Even so, one example is a thin reed on which to base
such an extravagant conclusion. Indeed, in a subsequent article, Bagaric and Clarke state
rather more circumspectly that torture is sometimes effective, and cite some further
examples, including Posner and Vermeule’s evidence from Israel, and the case of
Murad.147
137

Id.
REJALI, supra note 80, at 507. See also MCCOY, supra note 66 at 111-12.
139
REJALI, supra note 80, at 507. However, Dershowitz continues to rely on this example in more recent
writing. See Dershowitz, supra note 126.
140
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 56, at 196.
141
Id.
142
See REJALI, supra note 80, at 517 (noting instances of Israeli interrogators going home in the evenings
and weekends in cases of supposed ticking bombs).
143
Id. at 195. Additionally, it is difficult to know what to make of Posner and Vermeule’s arguments about
coercive interrogation given their claims of non-expertise in national security matters and their professed
agnosticism about national security policy. See Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 569, 610-11 (2008) (reviewing ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE
(2007)); Alice Ristophe, Professors Strangelove, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 245, 254 (2008)
(reviewing ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2007)).
144
Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 52, at 588-89.
145
See Jessberger, supra note 89, at 1061-62.
146
Id.
147
Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Tortured Responses (A Reply to our Critics): Physically Persuading
Suspects is Morally Preferable to Allowing the Innocent to be Murdered, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 716-718
138

54

Vol. 7:1]

John Ip

¶49

President Bush’s 2006 speech that revealed the CIA’s HVD program advanced
several further examples as evidence of the success of the CIA’s “alternative set of
procedures” for interrogating high-value al Qaeda detainees.148 Some of these examples
do not stand up to scrutiny. The President emphasized the interrogation of al Qaeda
member Abu Zubaydah as being significant in the apprehension of two al Qaeda leaders.
Bush claimed that Zubaydah had revealed that “mukhtar” was the nickname of 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and that this was an important piece of
information in the pursuit of Mohammed.149 However, according to the 9/11 Commission
Report, this fact was known since August 2001.150 Additionally, some of the information
was obtained from him without coercion.151 The ultimately redundant information about
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s nickname, for example, was revealed to an FBI agent who
questioned Abu Zubaydah in the hospital without the use of coercion.152 A careful parsing
of President Bush’s speech confirms that Abu Zubaydah revealed this information before
coercion was used.
¶50
President Bush also claimed that Abu Zubaydah, upon being subjected to the CIA’s
“alternative set of procedures,” identified another al Qaeda leader, Ramzi bin al Shibh.153
This claim is also dubious, as al Shibh’s involvement in al Qaeda and role in the 9/11
attacks were already a matter of public knowledge.154 Both Ramzi bin al Shibh and
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were ultimately apprehended through information obtained
(2006). A number of the other examples cited by Bagaric and Clarke are also problematic. They cite as an
example how authorities in the Philippines broke open the 1993 World Trade Center bombings “when they
threatened to torture a suspect.” Id. at 718. The source they rely on, however, states: “Philippine police
reportedly helped crack the 1993 World Trade Center bombings (plus a plot to crash 11 U.S. airliners and
kill the pope) by convincing a suspect that they were about to turn him over to the Israelis.” See Alter,
supra note 39. Thus, the example turns out to be the Murad case, and is subject to the same criticisms.
Dershowitz appears to make the same error. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 44, at 248 n.11. Additionally,
Bagaric and Clarke cite a possibly self-serving French General’s account of his use of torture during the
Battle of Algiers. Rejali provides a more skeptical view about whether the Battle of Algiers demonstrates
the effectiveness of torture. He convincingly argues that public cooperation and informants, rather than
torture, provided the French with accurate information. See REJALI, supra note 80, at 480-92.
148
President Bush, supra note 78.
149
Id.
150
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 277 (2004).
151
Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, FBI, CIA Debate Significance of Terror Suspect, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2007, at A1 (“There is little dispute, according to officials from both agencies, that Abu Zubaida provided
some valuable intelligence before CIA interrogators began to rough him up, including information that
helped identify Khalid Sheik Mohammed”); see also RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 116-17
(2006) (discussing how a CIA interrogator convinced Abu Zubaydah that it was his religious obligation to
cooperate).
152
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 68 (May 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf. The reference to the person identified as travelling to
attack America by Abu Zubaydah is, according to Jane Mayer, regarded as referring to Jose Padilla.
However, Abu Zubaydah again revealed this information without the use of coercion. See MAYER, supra
note 59, at 176.
153
President Bush, supra note 78.
154
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED 89 (2007) (“[T]here are
more than twenty references to al Shib’s involvement in al Qaeda in the Washington Post alone that
predate Zubaydah’s capture.”) (emphasis in original); see also Mark Mazzetti, Questions Raised About
Bush's Primary Claims in Defense of Secret Detention System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A24
(“American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh’s role in the [9/11] attacks months before Mr.
Zubaydah’s capture.”).
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from tip offs. The critical information in the apprehension of the former came from the
Emir of Qatar; the information leading to the capture of the latter came from an
anonymous informant who collected a $25 million reward.155
¶51
Quite apart from the shaky evidence for torture’s effectiveness, there is also clear
evidence of the contrary; there are clear instances of torture or coercion producing
unreliable evidence. For example, Shafiq Rasul, Ruhal Ahmed and Asif Iqbal, known as
the “Tipton Three,” were accused of having links to al Qaeda on the basis of being
apparently captured on a videotape of a meeting in Afghanistan between September 11
hijacker, Mohamed Atta, and Osama bin Laden.156 After a long period of multiple
interrogations that included the application of various coercive techniques, Rasul
confessed to being in the video,157 as did Ahmed and Iqbal.158 The falsity of their
confessions was later confirmed by British intelligence, which demonstrated conclusively
that all three had been in England at the time the video was made, as Rasul had long
claimed.159
¶52
Ultimately, only narrow conclusions can be drawn from these examples and
counter-examples. It is difficult to sustain the claim that torture or coercive interrogation
techniques never work; but it does not follow that such techniques can be characterized as
effective in eliciting truth either. All that can be said is that the effectiveness of these
techniques is, at best, equivocal.160 This complex reality, however, is essentially assumed
out of the way by the ticking bomb scenario.
4. One-off Situation
¶53

Finally, the ticking bomb scenario assumes an individual’s decision to torture in a
single situation of dire emergency.161 But the focus on the hypothetical moral quandary
faced by one interrogator again obscures reality: the decision to torture is not a one-off
decision made by a single person. Rather, as Kim Lane Scheppele emphasizes, the
decision to employ torture involves institutions, bureaucracies and guidelines:
The real-world question that arises is not whether you or I would torture
the Manhattan nuclear terrorist personally, but instead whether we can
design rules for agents in complex organizations . . . that would in fact
155

Ron Suskind, The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14, TIME, Sept. 10, 2006, at 34, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1533436,00.html. See also David Rose, Tortured
Reasoning, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2008/12/torture200812 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009).
156
David Rose, Revealed: The Full Story of the Guantanamo Britons, THE OBSERVER, March 14, 2004,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/mar/14/terrorism.guantanamo. The fate of Ibn al-Sheikh
al-Libi is another notable example. See infra text accompanying notes 179-181.
157
See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 40-43 (2006)
(outlining how Rasul was short-shackled, subjected to deafening music, and kept in prolonged isolation).
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Rose, supra note 156.
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MARGULIES, supra note 157, at 42. False confessions in the “war on terror” are not isolated incidents.
See infra text accompanying notes 179-184 (outlining the false information extracted from Ibn al-Sheikh
al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah concerning links between Iraq and al Qaeda). See also Brian J. Foley,
Guantanamo and Beyond Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1009, 1046-48
(2007).
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See generally REJALI, supra note 80, at 446-518.
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Luban, supra note 34, at 47.
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limit torture to situations like this hypothetical, where we might agree as a
political community that torture would be warranted. The decision to
torture is wrongly presented in the hypothetical as a personal moral
choice, when the actual decision would in fact be a political judgment
about standard operating procedures for a bureaucracy.162
¶54

By making the decision to torture a personal moral choice of a lone interrogator in
a single exceptional situation, rather than a decision situated within a bureaucracy,
attention need not be given to such matters as the treatment of one’s own troops captured
in future conflicts,163 or the long run impact on international legitimacy.164 Nor need there
be concern about the possibility of the spread of the practice of torture, which was
precisely what occurred after 9/11. The use of torture and other coercive interrogation
techniques began with the CIA’s interrogation of high-value al Qaeda detainees who
were thought to have critical information about further attacks on the United States.165
Soon, however, in response to demands for more intelligence, some of the same
techniques came to be employed more widely, first against detainees in Guantánamo, and
later in Iraq, a traditional theater of war.166 As Jeremy Waldron observes, “The torture at
Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with ‘ticking bomb’ terrorism. It was intended to ‘soften
up’ detainees so that U.S. military intelligence could get information from them about
likely attacks by Iraqi insurgents against American occupiers.”167 It is unsurprising that
the use of torture post-9/11 spread. Indeed, this pattern is consistent with the history of
attempts to confine and regulate torture.168
5. Summary

¶55

The ticking bomb scenario has, as Luban puts it, “displaced genuine issues in the
public forum and substituted a fictitious example stacked in favor of torturepermissiveness.”169 This fictitious example is a clever thought experiment, but one that
has a tenuous grounding in reality. The fact that one might be willing to countenance
torture in a hypothetical extreme situation in order to avert catastrophe provides little
guidance as to whether torture should be adopted as part of counterterrorism policy.170
162

Scheppele, supra note 130, at 305. See also YUVAL GINBAR, WHY NOT TORTURE TERRORISTS 132-136
(2008).
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See Marci Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1305 (2005).
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See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 140 (2007); Strauss, supra note 163, at 130304.
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See MCCOY, supra note 66, at 120-21.
166
Id. at 123-43, 195 (“Orders from President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld for the CIA to torture just a
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Guantánamo, and thousands at Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi prisons.”).
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Waldron, supra note 40, at 1717.
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REJALI, supra note 80, at 526 (noting that as a historical matter, “populations liable to be tortured,
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supra note 56, at 201.
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Scheppele, supra note 130, at 306-7.
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This is because, as detailed above, the scenario’s pristine and ideal assumptions and
conditions are highly unlikely ever to be met.171 Even the CIA’s interrogation of highvalue Al Qaeda detainees falls outside the ticking bomb scenario’s boundaries. These
detainees were held, interrogated, and tortured over a long period of time.172 As such, any
imminent terrorist plots that they might have been privy to would presumably have come
to fruition. Of course, such detainees might have had valuable information about al
Qaeda’s operations in general or other long-range plans.173 But the use of torture and
coercion to elicit this information, however useful, cannot be justified by the ticking
bomb scenario if one takes its parameters seriously.
B. Dissenting Voices in Government
¶56

Despite the pro-torture and coercion stance at the highest levels of the Bush
Administration, there was not a complete consensus on either the legality or wisdom of
employing aggressive interrogation techniques. Certain individuals and institutions,
including notably the FBI and many military lawyers, opposed the use of torture and
coercion on the basis of its inefficacy and long-run costs. In doing so, they reiterated
many of the academic arguments discussed in the previous section.
¶57
The FBI was skeptical of the utility of torture and coercive interrogation
techniques. This was a reflection of its traditional law enforcement role, which
emphasized the importance of obtaining statements that were admissible in court.174 The
FBI also had experience in dealing with al Qaeda in the 1990s, including the
investigation that led to the prosecutions for the first bombing of the World Trade Center.
In contrast to the CIA’s more aggressive attitude, the FBI advocated a patient, noncoercive, rapport-building approach to interrogation.175 The FBI’s approach is
exemplified by Dan Coleman, a retired FBI agent who investigated the embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya prior to 9/11. Coleman and others succeeded in
eliciting confessions from al Qaeda operatives, who later pleaded guilty to various
terrorism charges.176 Coleman continued to adhere to his rapport-based view of
interrogation after 9/11.177

171

Luban, supra note 28, at 7. See also Luban, supra note 34, at 45-46.
See REJALI, supra note 80, at 526 (noting that the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to various forms of
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Khalid Sheik Mohammed, for example, provided intelligence about al Qaeda that was later incorporated
into the report of the 9/11 Commission. See Shane, supra note 172 (“Mr. Mohammed provided more and
more detail on Al Qaeda’s structure, its past plots and its aspirations.”).
174
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 47. The great majority of FBI agents continued to adhere to
this position and did not participate in coercive interrogations. See id. at 361, 369.
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Suskind, supra note 155. It should be noted though that certain veterans of the CIA have been critical of
the administration’s approach. See Jason Vest, CIA Veterans Condemn Torture, NAT’L J., Nov. 19, 2005, at
3651, available at http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/1119nj1.htm.
176
Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6.
177
Id. (quoting Coleman as stating, “‘Brutalization doesn’t work. We know that. Besides, you lose your
soul.’”).
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¶58

The fate of one of the first high-ranking al Qaeda operatives captured by the United
States, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, represented a microcosm of the disagreement between the
FBI and CIA over interrogating detainees. Coleman’s colleague, Jack Cloonan, urged
FBI agents in Afghanistan to question al-Libi according to the usual protocols. The
agents reportedly began developing a rapport with him—al-Libi even told his
interrogators about a plot to attack the United States embassy in Aden, which was
subsequently averted.178 The CIA, however, believing that al-Libi was not being entirely
forthcoming, had him rendered to Egypt.179 Having been subjected to various forms of
torture and coercion, he claimed that Iraq had trained al Qaeda members in the use of
chemical and biological weapons.180 He subsequently recanted in 2004, but not before his
claim of a collaborative relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein had been
used by the Bush administration as one of the justifications for the Iraq war.181
¶59
The FBI and CIA had a similar clash over the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, who
was captured in March 2002 and initially jointly questioned.182 The FBI was satisfied
with the headway they were making with non-coercive questioning. The CIA once again
felt that Abu Zubaydah was not being forthright with them, and subjected him to coercive
techniques such as forced nudity, cold and loud music.183 One FBI agent described the
CIA’s techniques as amounting to “borderline torture.”184 The FBI’s Counterterrorism
Assistant Director, Pasquale D’Amuro, subsequently ordered his agents to come home
and not participate in any aggressive interrogations.185 D’Amuro’s decision was later
affirmed by FBI Director Robert Mueller.186
¶60
FBI agents based at Guantánamo faced similar issues.187 In 2002, multiple
governmental agencies, including the CIA and FBI, were present at Guantánamo. The
military leadership at Guantánamo was also coming under increasing pressure from
Washington to deliver actionable intelligence.188 The debate focused around the
interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani,189 whose case proved to be the catalyst for the
178

MAYER, supra note 59, at 105.
Id. at 106. See also SUSKIND, supra note 151, at 75-76.
180
MAYER, supra note 59, at 135 (describing al-Libi’s claims that he was beaten and locked in a small cage
for over eighty hours); Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described,
ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866 (describing CIA
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a cold cell while being regularly doused with cold water) (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
181
REJALI, supra note 80, at 504-05. See also MAYER, supra note 59, at 136-37 (noting that al-Libi’s claim
of a collaborative relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein was important in persuading
Secretary of State Powell to make his February 2003 speech before the United Nations Security Council).
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 67.
183
Eggen & Pincus, supra note 151.
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 68. Abu Zubaydah was also subjected to other coercive
techniques, including sleep deprivation and waterboarding. Under duress, he revealed all kinds of
information about various terrorist plots and targets, although their reliability is uncertain. See REJALI,
supra note 80 at 505-06; SUSKIND, supra note 151, at 115-16. According to Rose, Abu Zubaydah also
admitted under torture that there was a collaborative relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.
See Rose, supra note 155.
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 69.
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Id. at 71.
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Between January 2002 and December 2004, more than four hundred FBI agents were deployed to
Guantánamo. See id. at 32.
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SANDS, supra note 91, at 53.
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 77-82.
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loosening of the military’s rules on interrogation. In September, a series of meetings took
place to discuss new interrogation techniques.190 The result was a memorandum written
by Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer that outlined eighteen interrogation techniques.191
This memorandum was backed by a further memorandum written by Lieutenant Colonel
Diane Beaver, which concluded that all the techniques were legal.192 The request for
approval of these techniques was sent to the Pentagon. William Haynes, General Counsel
for the Department of Defense, recommended the approval of fifteen of the eighteen
techniques.193 Of the harshest “Category III” techniques, Haynes recommended only the
blanket approval of “mild, non-injurious physical contact,” although he noted that “all
Category III techniques may be legally available.”194 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave
his approval on December 2, 2002.195
¶61
As the military sought to push the interrogation envelope at Guantánamo, the FBI
agents present objected, as evidenced by various documents later made public. For
example, an email from a FBI counterterrorism official to General Donald Ryder of the
Army’s Criminal Investigation Command detailed instances of “highly aggressive
interrogation techniques,” including apparent physical torture, which had been observed
by FBI agents at Guantánamo in late 2002.196 Similarly, an unnamed FBI agent based at
Guantánamo sent a memorandum by facsimile on November 27, 2002 to Marion
Bowman, legal counsel at the FBI.197 This memorandum offered a legal analysis of
various interrogation techniques that closely matched the list of techniques proposed by
Phifer.198 It concluded that many of the techniques were illegal, and any information
obtained through the use of such methods would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. It
also concluded that some of the more aggressive Category II and III methods might
violate the federal Torture Statute.199 Interestingly, the anonymous author also discussed
the Category IV technique of extraordinary rendition—the practice of transferring
190

SANDS, supra note 91, at 72-73.
Jerald Phifer, Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Request for Approval of CounterResistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20040622doc3.pdf.
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Diane E. Beaver, Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Review of Aggressive
Interrogation Techniques (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/d20040622doc3.pdf.
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William J. Haynes II, Action Memo, Counter-Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
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T. J. Harrington, Re. Suspected Mistreatment of Detainees (July 14, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf.
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See SANDS, supra note 91, at 145-146. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 80-129.
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detainees to third countries for harsh interrogations—and concluded that “[t]his technique
[could] not be utilized without violating U.S. Federal law.”200
¶62
In 2003 and 2004, other unnamed FBI agents would document their observations of
the military’s interrogations.201 In one particular email, dated December 5, 2003, an FBI
agent referred to the military’s practices as “torture techniques.”202 The agent also noted
that these tactics had produced no useful intelligence, and had made criminal prosecution
of the tortured detainee impossible.203 All in all, two hundred FBI agents deployed at
Guantánamo reported that they had heard about or observed the use of coercive
techniques such as sleep deprivation, stress positions, shackling, isolation, bright lights
and loud music.204
¶63
Like the FBI, Alberto Mora, at the time the general counsel of the United States
Navy, opposed the torture and mistreatment of detainees. Mora’s resistance centered on
his attempt to stop the recommendations of the Defense Department Working Group
from becoming military policy.205 In December 2002, Mora learnt of events at
Guantánamo from David Brant of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, who
supervised a team of agents working in conjunction with the FBI.206 Brant passed along
his agents’ reports of the military’s interrogation practices at Guantánamo. Mora later
saw Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval of the various coercive interrogation techniques, as
well as the underlying legal analysis of the Beaver memorandum, which Mora considered
flawed. Mora met with Haynes to express his concerns.207 In January 2003, Brant
informed Mora that nothing had changed, which led to Mora meeting Haynes again.208 In
their meeting, Haynes stated that American officials believed that the interrogation
techniques were needed in order to extract from the Guantánamo detainees critical
information about further attacks.209 Mora responded to Haynes’ invocation of the ticking
bomb scenario:
200
Id. The Inspector General’s report discusses a November 2002 interrogation plan for al-Qahtani that
involved four phases. Phase IV was rendition to a third country such as Jordan or Egypt. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 88-89. Margulies notes that Category IV was ultimately not included in the
Phifer memorandum of October 11, 2002. See MARGULIES, supra note 157, at 98-99. Mayer states that the
disappearance of Category IV was due to FBI resistance. See MAYER, supra note 59, at 220.
201
Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Has the Government Come Clean?, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
5, 2005, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/48419.
202
Dan Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A01.
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Id.
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 171. See also John Barry, Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff,
The Roots Of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/105387/output/print (“Under the leadership of an aggressive, self-assured
major general named Geoffrey Miller, a new set of interrogation rules became doctrine. . . . These included
the use of harsh heat or cold; withholding food; hooding for days at a time; naked isolation in cold, dark
cells for more than 30 days, and threatening (but not biting) by dogs. It also permitted limited use of ‘stress
positions’ designed to subject detainees to rising levels of pain.”).
205
See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
206
Jane Mayer, The Memo, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/27/060227fa_fact (quoting Mora as stating “‘The debate here
isn't only how to protect the country. It's how to protect our values.’”).
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Id.
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Id.
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Alberto J. Mora, Memorandum for Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Statement for the
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I acknowledged the ethical issues were difficult. I was not sure what my
position would be in the classic “ticking bomb” scenario where the
terrorist being interrogated had knowledge of, say, an imminent nuclear
weapon attack against a U.S. city. If I were the interrogator involved, I
would probably apply the torture myself, although I would do so with full
knowledge of potentially severe personal consequences. But I did not feel
this was the factual situation we faced in Guantanamo, and even if I were
willing to do this as an individual and assume the personal consequences,
by the same token I did not consider it appropriate for us to advocate for
or cause the laws and values of our nation to be changed to render the
activity lawful.210
¶64

On January 15, Haynes called Mora to tell him that Secretary Rumsfeld was
suspending his earlier authorization of December 2, 2002, and that Rumsfeld was
convening a special Defense Department Working Group to consider interrogation
guidelines.211 However, Haynes bureaucratically outmaneuvered Mora. Despite Mora
recommending to Haynes that Rumsfeld not approve the Working Group’s draft report,
which was based on another memorandum written by John Yoo,212 Rumsfeld—without
Mora’s knowledge—did just that.213 The final Working Group memorandum included a
list of thirty-five interrogation techniques.214 On April 16, 2003, the Pentagon approved
twenty-four of those techniques for use at Guantánamo.215
¶65
Another locus of resistance to the use of torture and coercion was the military’s
own lawyers, which was in keeping with the military’s traditional policy of humane
treatment of detainees and compliance with the law of armed conflict.216 In debates over
the treatment of detainees after 9/11, senior military lawyers consistently opposed the use
of torture and coercion. In November 2002, military lawyers were already expressing
reservations about the interrogation techniques proposed for use at Guantánamo. Several
memoranda recorded serious concerns that the suggested interrogation techniques would
be illegal and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States.217 These concerns
210
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Staff (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
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McCahon, Assessment of JTF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential Impact on CITF
Mission and Personnel (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
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prompted further review. But William Haynes cut this short, clearing the way for
Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization in December 2002.218
¶66
The resistance of the military’s lawyers continued. Notably, the leadership of the
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, like Alberto Mora, disagreed with the approach taken
by the Defense Department Working Group. For example, Rear Admiral Michael Lohr,
Judge Advocate General for the United States Navy, although not contesting the
questionable conclusions about the legality of the interrogation techniques, urged caution
on policy grounds:
[W]hile we may have found a unique situation in Guantánamo where the
protections of the Geneva Conventions, U.S. statutes, and even the
Constitution do not apply, will the American people find we have missed
the forest for the trees by condoning practices that, while technically legal,
are inconsistent with our most fundamental values? How would such
perceptions affect our ability to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism?219
¶67

Major General Jack Rives, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the United States
Air Force, was more pointed in his analysis, and observed that several of the exceptional
interrogation techniques “on their face, amount[ed] to violations of domestic criminal law
and the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice].”220 General Rives also urged that
consideration “be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and
self-image.”221 He noted that American armed forces had been “consistently trained to
take the legal and moral ‘high-road’ in the conduct of our military operations regardless
of how others may operate.”222 Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler, Staff Judge
Advocate of the United States Marine Corps, expressed a similar view, suggesting that
the authorization of “aggressive counter-resistance techniques” by the military would
negatively impact the “Pride, Discipline, and Self-Respect within the U.S. Armed
Forces.”223 General Sandkuhler and the other Judge Advocates General also highlighted
the position of captured American service members, a matter that they did not think had
been adequately considered.224
218
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¶68

The advice of these military lawyers was ignored. In May 2003, after the Working
Group’s report had taken effect,225 several unnamed senior members of the Judge
Advocate General’s Corps visited Scott Horton, at the time the head of the Human Rights
Committee of the New York City Bar Association.226 They discussed with him the
decisions that, in their view, would lead to detainee abuse and possible violations of the
Geneva Conventions. They urged him to challenge the Bush administration’s policies.227
¶69
The public opposition amongst senior military lawyers towards the administration’s
policies did not cease.228 In 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the
legal authority to prosecute terrorists. As part of those hearings, the Judge Advocates
General of the military services were asked to submit written responses to questions
regarding various coercive interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.229 General
Rives, General Sandkuhler, Rear Major General Scott Black of the U.S. Army, and
Admiral Bruce MacDonald of the U.S. Navy all concluded that waterboarding was illegal
and violated common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.230 Generals Rives and
Sandkuhler further stated that waterboarding would constitute torture under the Torture
Statute.231 Their forthright answers provide a pointed contrast to the equivocations of
Attorney General Michael Mukasey on the same issue in 2008.232
C. Torture and Battlestar Galactica
¶70

Sci-Fi Channel’s remake of the television show Battlestar Galactica follows the
basic contours of the 1970s original, where most of human society is wiped out in a
surprise attack on the twelve colonies by the Cylons, metallic robots with the iconic
oscillating red-eye. Protected by a single warship, the Battlestar Galactica, a fleet of the
human survivors sets out in search of a mythical thirteenth colony, known as Earth.233
The small band of human survivors is outgunned, on the run, and under near-constant
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threat of oblivion—a milieu where the imperatives of necessity and survival coexist
uneasily with legality.
¶71
The re-imagined Battlestar Galactica differs from its 1970s iteration in some
significant ways. It eschews the modern and clean aesthetics characteristic of much
science fiction in favor of a vintage, naturalistic look.234 This visual presentation matches
the darker tone of the re-imagined series, which lacks the escapist jauntiness of its
predecessor.235 Further, in a nod to the science-fiction classic Bladerunner,236 not only are
the Cylons originally human creations, but they now also have several models that appear
completely human. These new Cylon models, which the humans refer to as “skin jobs,”
act as spies, sleeper agents, and suicide bombers. The ability of these humanoid Cylons to
effortlessly infiltrate society preys on a classic human anxiety, amplified after 9/11, of
enemies lurking in our midst.237 Indeed the idea of a fifth column, or enemies within, has
notable echoes in American history, including the Palmer raids, the Japanese internment
and the red scare.238
¶72
During the three complete seasons of Battlestar Galactica that have aired to date,
there have been several notable depictions of coercive interrogation. The Cylons,
naturally, engage in torture. They show little compunction in using torture during their
occupation of New Caprica, a planet the humans have settled on at the end of season 2.
Saul Tigh, a leader of the human resistance, for example, has his eye ripped out.239 Later,
the Cylons torture Gaius Baltar, the wonderfully narcissistic and self-serving human
genius, for information about a virus that has infected them.240 However, the focus of this
article is on instances when humans, with whom the audience for the most part identifies,
employ torture and coercion.241
¶73
Battlestar Galactica’s depiction of torture by humans is ostensibly ambiguous.
According to the show’s creators, this was a deliberate choice, the idea being to
undermine the settled expectations of the audience and force them to confront difficult
issues.242 This moral ambiguity is a hallmark of the show.243 However, as Christian
Erickson argues, a morally ambiguous depiction already contains an element of
subversiveness;244 ambiguity is subversive because it undermines the certainty of the
234
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discourse of counter-terrorism.245 Erickson is referring primarily to the actions of the
humans at the beginning of season 3, when most of the human race remains trapped on
Cylon-occupied New Caprica.246 Harking back to Vichy France, and alluding more
controversially to the Iraqi insurgency,247 some of the humans form an underground
resistance to oppose the Cylons and their puppet human government. The resistance’s
tactics include suicide bombing. The humans themselves do not agree on the morality of
their actions: while resistance leader Saul Tigh sees suicide bombing as a necessary
means to an end, Laura Roslin (the human President for most of the show) ultimately
cannot countenance such action.248 The correct course is left unclear.249 The same point
applies to Battlestar Galactica’s portrayal of torture and coercion. The audience is
confronted with the question of whether torturing the captive is the correct course, with
the result that it is often unclear whether one should empathize with the torturer or the
tortured.250 This contrasts with the moral certainty characteristic both of 24,251 and some
real-world advocates of torture.252
¶74
In addition to this subversive ambiguity, the relevant episodes of Battlestar
Galactica, on closer inspection, reproduce some of the critiques of the use of
interrogational torture and coercion discussed in the previous sections. In particular, the
use of torture and coercion is depicted as ineffective and difficult (if not impossible) to
contain.
1. Skepticism about the Efficacy of Torture
¶75

Battlestar Galactica consistently portrays the use of torture and coercion as being an
ineffective tool of interrogation, particularly relative to non-coercive alternatives. The
season 1 episode that deals with torture was prompted by the events at Abu Ghraib prison
245
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in Iraq.253 Here, one of the human-like Cylons, known as Leoben Conroy, is captured
aboard a civilian ship in the fleet. Commander William Adama, who commands the
Galactica, wants him destroyed; President Roslin wants him interrogated. Lieutenant
Kara Thrace (usually referred to by her call-sign “Starbuck”) begins to interrogate
Leoben, who claims to have planted a nuclear warhead somewhere in the fleet that will
detonate in less than nine hours.254 And so Battlestar Galactica sets up a classic ticking
bomb scenario.
¶76
Starbuck informs Adama and Roslin about the bomb. Adama orders radiological
searches throughout the fleet while Starbuck returns to interrogate Leoben further about
the location of the bomb. Starbuck surmises that because Leoben is programmed to act
like a human, he will respond to stimuli, such as pain.255 The interrogation quickly turns
violent as Starbuck has a marine beat Leoben. Although he is bloodied, Leoben reveals
nothing. In the face of Leoben’s intransigence, Starbuck decides to up the torture ante:
“Now the gloves come off,” she tells Leoben,256 echoing the real-life words of former
counterterrorism official Cofer Black.257 Starbuck then has marines force Leoben
underwater for increasing periods of time.258 Leoben talks, but not about the location of
the bomb. Near the conclusion of the episode, President Roslin arrives to halt Starbuck’s
torture of Leoben, which has not revealed any useful information. She admonishes
Starbuck: “You spent the last eight hours torturing this man, this machine, whatever it is.
And you don’t have a single piece of information to show for it.”259 After Leoben has
been dried off, Roslin apologizes to him about his treatment, and attempts to reason with
him instead. Leoben reveals that in fact there is no nuclear warhead. He also insinuates
that Adama is a Cylon. Roslin has him ejected into space.260
¶77
The point to emphasize is that torture in this ticking bomb scenario does not work:
Leoben never reveals any useful information under torture. Only after the torture has
stopped does he reveal to Roslin that there is no ticking bomb. This skeptical view about
the efficacy of torture continues in later seasons. In season 2, with the arrival of Admiral
Helena Cain’s Battlestar Pegasus, the audience learns that the Galactica was not the only
warship to survive the initial Cylon attack on the twelve colonies.261 It turns out that the
Galactica and the Pegasus are each holding one human-like Cylon captive. Both Cylon
captives are valuable because they have general knowledge of the Cylons’ nature and
tactics, although not necessarily of their imminent plans; there are no ticking bombs to be
heard. Indeed, this is more closely analogous to the actual situation faced by the United
States in relation to its most valuable terrorist detainees.262
¶78
The paths taken to uncover information from the two Cylon captives differ. Adama
treats his Cylon captive humanely, whereas Cain is willing to use torture and coercion.
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Their contrasting methods reflect the divergence of approach in real-life
counterterrorism, highlighted, for example, by the disagreement between the FBI and
CIA over the interrogation of terrorist suspects.263
¶79
The crew of the Pegasus is holding a Cylon known as Gina. Gina posed as a
civilian network administrator working on the Pegasus prior to the Cylon attack. Later,
she helped “upgrade” the Pegasus’ computer systems, and found an inviting Cylon target
to attack.264 This was in fact a trap, and the Pegasus’ weapons systems failed at the crucial
moment, presumably having been sabotaged by Gina. The Cylons boarded the Pegasus,
presumably aided again by Gina. During the ensuing battle inside the ship, Gina was
revealed to be a Cylon after one of the Pegasus’ officers killed a duplicate copy of her.
She was captured after a brief struggle.265 Stunned by Gina’s betrayal, Cain subsequently
orders Lieutenant Thorne to interrogate her. Cain guesses that Gina has human frailties as
well. She authorizes the use of “pain . . . degradation, fear, shame.”266 To drive home the
point, Cain gives Thorne carte blanche: “I want you to really test its limits. Be as creative
as you feel you need to be.”267 Subsequently, Cain looks impassively upon an obviously
beaten and bleeding Gina. Later, it is revealed that Thorne and other members of the
Pegasus’ crew sexually brutalized her as well.268
¶80
By contrast, the Galactica’s Cylon prisoner, Sharon, is treated humanely.
Commander Adama informs Admiral Cain that Sharon has been cooperative, and has
proven to be a valuable source of intelligence.269 In fact, in the previous episode, Sharon
saved the Galactica after a Cylon virus had infected the ship’s computer systems.270 Gaius
Baltar confirms with Cain that Sharon has provided useful intelligence about Cylon
systems, tactics, and strategy.271 Cain is surprised that Baltar has been able to obtain this
intelligence without coercion. Baltar replies that he finds “the application of coercive
techniques to be counterproductive,” and that he gets greater cooperation by treating
Sharon “as if it’s the human being it pretends to be.”272 Although she appears to express
some disdain for this apparent coddling of the enemy, Cain admits that the torture of Gina
carried out by Thorne and others has proven fruitless. She requests that Baltar examine
Gina.273
¶81
When Baltar first sees Gina, she is manacled and chained to the floor by the neck
and feet; she appears badly beaten, and lies motionless. Baltar demands that she be given
food, clothing, and be allowed to bathe.274 Cain is not interested, and points out that Gina
is responsible for the deaths of several hundred of her crew, suggesting that Gina’s
torture may be as much about cathartic revenge as obtaining information. Baltar replies
that the Cylon psyche can be manipulated like that of humans, and that it is time to try a
263
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different approach.275 Subsequently, Baltar brings Gina some food, has the guards remove
her restraints, and begins talking to her. At this point, she finally shows signs of life.276
¶82
During the following episode, Cain comes to the detention cell to observe Baltar’s
interrogation. She looks on with obvious disgust, and at one point, kicks Gina in the face
and spits on her. Cain has pictures of a mysterious Cylon ship, and asks Baltar to see
whether he can find out what its function is.277 Baltar later brings Gina some clothing. As
she puts on the clothing, the audience sees the terrible scarring on her back, the result of
the torture she has suffered.278 Having gained a measure of trust in Baltar, Gina reveals
what her mission was, and that she expected to die upon completion of that mission. She
tells Baltar that she wants to die.279 Baltar replies that she cannot die, because, as a Cylon,
her consciousness will simply be downloaded into another body.280 Gina discloses that if
the mysterious Cylon ship is destroyed, she really can die. Gina thus reveals the function
of the previously unidentified resurrection ship, which allows downloading when the
Cylons are far away from their home-world.281
¶83
Once again, it is striking that the use of torture and coercion provides no useful
intelligence. By contrast, it is Baltar who is successful in getting cooperation from Gina,
which in turn leads to the identification of the resurrection ship. Similarly, Sharon’s
humane treatment has already been shown to have very tangible benefits for the
Galactica. The different treatment of the two Cylons can readily be interpreted as an
allegorical critique of the Bush Administration’s treatment of terrorist detainees.282
¶84
Finally, in season 3, Baltar, who collaborated with the Cylons as the head of the
puppet government during their occupation of New Caprica, has been held by the Cylons
for a considerable amount of time. The human leadership wishes to extract any useful
information that he might have about the Cylons. The audience learns that Baltar has
been deprived of sleep, and in response has gone on hunger strike; he attempts suicide at
the beginning of the episode.283 President Roslin suggests an alternative interrogation
plan. She questions him about his involvement with the Cylons, which he denies. Roslin
appears to lose her cool, and to order him ejected from the airlock. This mock execution
gambit proves unsuccessful.284 Next, Roslin authorizes Adama’s suggestion of trying an
experimental hallucinogenic drug on Baltar. Having drugged Baltar, Adama and Roslin
attempt to extract information from him about the Cylons and his involvement with them.
But Baltar reveals nothing. The Galactica’s doctor eventually calls off the interrogation
once Baltar’s vital signs begin to drop precipitously.285 One final attempt to elicit
information from Baltar is made. Lieutenant Gaeta, who previously served as Baltar’s
aide on New Caprica, is sent to Baltar to act as a false friend, in the hope that Baltar will
275
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let something slip. But on this occasion, the non-coercive approach proves unsuccessful
as well. After discussing these failures with Adama, Roslin resigns herself to giving
Baltar a trial.286
¶85
Adama’s use of the hallucinogenic drug recalls the CIA’s search for a reliable truth
serum. Beginning in the 1940s, the CIA tested over one hundred and fifty substances to
determine whether they might be effective for use in interrogation.287 These included
substances such as coffee, alcohol, morphine, atrophine, heroin, LSD, cocaine, marijuana,
peyote, and so-called “truth serums” such as sodium amytal and sodium pentothal.288
Ultimately, the CIA concluded that there was no substance that could consistently cause
people to tell the truth,289 although the idea that such a substance exists has persisted.290
Adama’s fictional interrogation drug proves to be no exception. Thus, as with the other
episodes discussed above, the various coercive techniques in this episode—sleep
deprivation, mock execution, and the use of an interrogation drug—end up delivering
nothing of substance.
2. The Problem of Torture’s Spread
¶86

The use of torture and coercion spreads in Battlestar Galactica. Initially, torture is
something that demarcates the boundary between human and Cylon. Humans do not
torture humans; but Cylons—the mysterious, technologically superior, and apparently
single-minded enemy—can be tortured, for the very reason that they are not rightsbearing humans: they are machines.291 But this boundary subsequently proves unstable.
¶87
The very language the humans use to describe the Cylons emphasizes their nonhuman otherness. The standard moniker for a Cylon is a “toaster,” a reference to the
metallic appearance of earlier Cylon robotic models.292 This point comes through even
stronger in the episodes discussed above. Leoben Conroy is repeatedly referred to as an
“it,” which stresses Conroy’s mechanistic otherness.293 Throughout her torture of Leoben,
Starbuck emphasizes his non-human status. When President Roslin puts a stop to
Leoben’s torture, Starbuck states the moral calculus at work: “It’s a machine Sir. There’s
no limit to the tactics I can use.”294
¶88
Likewise, Cain and crew of the Pegasus consider Cylons, represented by Gina, to
be subhuman. Once Gina’s betrayal comes to light, a shocked Cain stammers, “Get that
thing off my bridge.”295 From that point onward, Gina is strictly an “it” or a “thing,”296
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and can therefore be treated as such by Cylon interrogator Lieutenant Thorne and others.
Thorne’s subsequent interrogation of Sharon, which Cain has ordered, follows the same
logic. Employing his usual interrogational modus operandi, Thorne chokes, beats and
attempts to rape Sharon. He is thwarted and accidentally killed by Helo and Chief Tyrol,
two members of the Galactica’s crew.297 Colonel Fisk, the executive officer of the
Pegasus, later rationalises Thorne’s actions and dismisses Helo’s concerns in the same
way that Starbuck justified her treatment of Leoben: “You can’t rape a machine,
Lieutenant.”298
¶89
The dichotomy in treatment between human and Cylon has historical parallels. In
ancient Greece and Rome, torture was reserved for non-citizen outsiders, namely those
who were “slaves, barbarians and foreigners.”299 Torture was therefore a mechanism that
demarcated the citizens from everyone else. In more modern times, public attention and
concern still seems to be more forthcoming when it is people like us who are being
subjected to torture. Thus, accounts of the torture of the Mau Mau in Kenya met with
indifference in Britain and internationally.300 Reports of French torture of Algerians met
with similar apathy; it was only when French police and military began to torture
Europeans that there was an international outcry and the beginnings of an anti-torture
movement.301 After 9/11, torture and its close cousins were also largely reserved for those
who were perceived as being the other. The fact that they were not like us made it
permissible to treat them this way.302 The Bush administration’s description of its terrorist
detainees was carefully chosen to accentuate this. Detainees were referred to as “aliens,”
“deadly enemies” and “faceless terrorists.”303 This dehumanizing rhetoric relegated them
to the ranks of the subhuman, increasing the distance between them, the captive terrorist
suspects, and us.304 Thus, they did not need to be afforded the rights that we have.305
Indeed, like the (literally) inhuman Cylons of Battlestar Galactica, they did not even need
to be the subjects of our moral concern.306
297
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However, as noted earlier, one of the difficulties with torture is its tendency to
spread in spite of attempts to confine it.307 This dynamic is illustrated in Battlestar
Galactica as torture and other coercive techniques come to be applied to humans as well.
Gaius Baltar, for example, is subjected to various forms of psychological torture and
coercion in season 3.308 But the starkest example arises out of the death of the Pegasus’
Cylon interrogator, Lieutenant Thorne, in season 2. Having accidentally killed Thorne as
he was about to sexually assault Sharon, Helo and Chief Tyrol are arrested and taken
back to the Pegasus, where Admiral Cain’s swiftly convened court-martial sentences both
to death.309 While they await their fate inside the Pegasus’ brig, Helo and Chief Tyrol are
confronted by several crewmembers of the Pegasus, who are angry about Thorne’s
death.310 Helo and Tyrol are overcome and restrained. They are then beaten in the
stomach with a bar of soap wrapped in a towel, which is, as one of the Pegasus’
crewmembers explains, very painful but leaves no marks.311 Colonel Fisk interrupts the
torture session soon after it begins. Despite his loyalty to Thorne, he reprimands the two
torturers for assaulting two colonial officers, and for “treating those men like they were
Cylons.”312 The subtext of Fisk’s statement is simply that there are certain things that can
be done to Cylons—beatings, whipping, sexual degradation—that cannot be done to
humans. But in the eyes of the Pegasus’ torturers, this dividing line is not so clear. Once
one has begun torturing Cylons without compunction, the next logical step is to do the
same to those who sympathize with them.
3. Summary

¶91

In sum, Battlestar Galactica’s account of torture is a skeptical one. Although there
is no overt moralizing about the evils of torture, the lack of moral certainty about the
correct course of action in itself provides a pointed contrast to the torture-is-a-no-brainer
view exemplified by 24. Perhaps most significantly, torture and other coercive
techniques, as depicted in Battlestar Galactica, are not effective in delivering instant
truth. If anything, the uses of these techniques are shown to be time consuming,
ineffective, and corrupting.
IV. LIFE IMITATES ART

¶92

The previous two parts of this article have discussed two contrasting narratives of
torture. Each narrative is reproduced at the level of popular culture by a television show,
24 and Battlestar Galactica respectively. Both these shows, then, are a reflection of post9/11 society, where the use of torture and coercion has been a genuine topic of debate. At
the same time, as part of popular culture, these shows do not simply reflect different sides
of the torture debate; they may influence and shape the debate as well. Stuart Croft
33 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 353, 363 (2007) (noting that the dehumanization of the terrorist other contributes to
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307
See supra text accompanying notes 165-168.
308
See supra text accompanying note 283-286.
309
Battlestar Galactica: Pegasus, supra note 261.
310
Battlestar Galactica: Resurrection Ship Part II, supra note 298.
311
On the use of “clean” beatings as torture, see REJALI, supra note 80, at 335-37.
312
Battlestar Galactica; Resurrection Ship Part II, supra note 298.

72

Vol. 7:1]

John Ip

ascribes considerable significance to popular culture in this regard; because of its
accessibility and pervasiveness, popular culture is important for reinforcing the discourse
of the “war on terror” throughout society.313 24 has played this role in relation to the use
of torture and coercion. Most disturbingly, it has reportedly been the source of inspiration
for actual interrogation techniques. Battlestar Galactica, representing a rival narrative
about torture, has not so far achieved the same level of cultural influence as 24. However,
Battlestar Galactica has achieved a degree of recognition as a television show that deals
with issues that face societies in times of crisis, including torture, and it has managed to
transcend the usual boundaries of the science fiction genre.
A. The 24 effect
¶93

The constant repetition of scenes of torture and other coercive techniques in 24 has
contributed to the audience becoming desensitized to the intentional and graphic
infliction of pain upon a captive victim.314 Further, 24 has reinforced the view that torture
and coercion is a necessary and justifiable tool in the grim struggle against terrorism.
This in turn has likely solidified public apathy and indifference to the use of torture and
coercion in counter-terrorism.315 Indeed, Scott Horton goes so far as to suggest that 24
has been created for the very purpose of creating “a more receptive public audience for
the Bush Administration’s torture policies.”316 Regardless of whether Horton is right
about this, 24 has certainly achieved such a level of cultural penetration that it is an
instantly recognizable shorthand for the pro-torture, torture-as-common-sense narrative.
¶94
24 has been aptly described as the nearest thing to “the Official Cultural Product of
the War on Terrorism,”317 and has been embraced by some notable people. Senator John
McCain, despite his public stance against torture, made a brief cameo in season 5 as an
unnamed member of CTU.318 In 2006, the Heritage Foundation held a forum entitled “24
and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Does it Matter?” Several
cast members, producers, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, and Michael
Chertoff, at the time the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, attended the
forum, which was chaired by conservative radio personality Rush Limbaugh.319 In the
313

STUART CROFT, CULTURE, CRISIS AND AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 204 (2006).
DAVID L. ALTHEIDE, TERRORISM AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 70 (2006) (“The reality of torture is muted
by popular-culture depictions that are important for familiarizing and desensitizing audiences to grotesque
cruelty.”); see also Neil McMaster, Torture: Algiers to Abu Ghraib, 46 RACE & CLASS 1, 4 (2004)
(singling out 24 for normalizing the idea of torture in the general public); Andrew Sullivan, Torture Nation,
THE DAILY DISH, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2007/02/torture_nation.html (arguing that the effect of
24 has been to normalize torture) (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
315
Parry, supra note 27, at 283-84; see also David Edelstein, Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex:
Torture Porn, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, Magazine, at 63, available at
http://nymag.com/movies/features/15622/ (“Our righteousness is buoyed by propaganda like the TV series
24, which devoted an entire season to justifying torture in the name of an imminent threat: a nuclear missile
en route to a major city.”).
316
Horton, supra note 90.
317
James Poniewozik, The Evolution of TV’s Tough Guy, TIME, Jan. 22, 2007, at 68, also available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1576853,00.html.
318
24: Day 5: 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 6, 2006); see also Troy Patterson,
Senator, We're Ready for Your Cameo, SLATE, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2135664/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 2009).
319
Paul Farhi, Calling On Hollywood’s Terrorism ‘Experts’, WASH. POST, June 24, 2006, at C01.
314

73

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2009

course of his remarks, Chertoff praised Jack Bauer, and even likened certain aspects of
the situation faced by the fictional CTU to that faced by the people working under him at
the Department of Homeland Security.320
¶95
Further blurring the boundary between entertainment and reality has been the
invocation of 24 and its hero in the course of debates about interrogation tactics and
national security policy. This is both an indictment on the level of the debate, and an
indicator of the show’s penetration into the popular consciousness. For example,
conservative pundit Laura Ingraham referred to the show’s popularity as being the closest
approximation to a national referendum on the permissibility of using torture and
coercion when interrogating high-value al Qaeda detainees.321 Similarly, during a debate
between Republican presidential candidates in 2007, several presidential hopefuls tried to
out-tough one another on the issue of torture and interrogation, which was raised—
predictably—in the context of a ticking bomb scenario.322 This itself was indicative of the
new normality where there was perceived electoral traction in appearing more willing
than one’s opponents to use the harshest interrogation techniques on a terrorist suspect.
Later in the debate, Congressman Tom Trancredo, when asked how far he would be
willing to go in order to deal with a hypothetical terrorist attack, quipped, “I’m looking
for Jack Bauer at that time, let me tell you.”323 The allusion to 24’s hero not only
established Tancredo’s pop culture bona fides, but also succinctly expressed his
willingness to let counter-terrorist agencies do whatever was necessary.324
¶96
A Canadian judge, during a panel discussion about torture at a legal conference in
Canada, invoked Jack Bauer in the same manner, but as a negative example. The judge
remarked, “Thankfully, security agencies in all our countries do not subscribe to the
mantra ‘What would Jack Bauer do?’”325 This caused Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia to launch into an impassioned defense of Jack Bauer. Referring to season 2 of 24,
when Bauer’s tough interrogation tactics save Los Angeles from nuclear incineration,
Justice Scalia argued that counterterrorism agents, both real and fictional, needed
maximum latitude to thwart terrorist attacks.326 Subsequently, Justice Scalia invoked the
same scenario when discussing the issue of torture in an interview with the BBC.327
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The Intelligence Science Board’s December 2006 report that addressed the issue of
torture and interrogation,328 entitled “Educing Information,” was a further exception to
the valorizing of 24. Referencing the main plotlines of seasons 2 and 3, the Board
emphasized the unreality of the show’s portrayal of interrogation:
Prime-time television increasingly offers up plot lines involving the
incineration of metropolitan Los Angeles by an atomic weapon or its
depopulation by an aerosol nerve toxin. The characters do not have the
time to reflect upon, much less to utilize, what real professionals know to
be the “science and art” of “educing information.” They want results.
Now. The public thinks the same way. They want, and rightly expect,
precisely the kind of “protection” that only a skilled intelligence
professional can provide. Unfortunately, they have no idea how such a
person is supposed to act “in real life.”329

That a Supreme Court justice and a report sponsored by government agencies330 should
reference a television show in discussing the issue of torture and interrogation is
extraordinary enough, but 24 has had an even more striking effect: the show appears to
have directly influenced the behavior of actual soldiers and interrogators. In November
2006, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, the dean of West Point, met with some of the
writers and producers of the show, and expressed concern that the show’s message about
the efficacy and morality of torture was affecting the training of American soldiers.331
Finnegan observed that he found it increasingly difficult to convince cadets that the
United States should continue to take the moral high ground, even in the absence of
reciprocity. He suggested that misconceptions about torture popularized by 24 were
partly responsible for this.332 Gary Solis, a retired Marine and Judge Advocate who also
taught at West Point, noted the same phenomenon with his students. When discussing the
legality and morality of torture, he found that some cadets had adopted Jack Bauer’s
ethos of being willing to do whatever was necessary to save American lives. Solis had to
remind them that the show was fictional, and was an inappropriate model for their
conduct.333
¶98
24’s co-creator and executive producer, Joel Surnow, who was notably absent from
the meeting with Finnegan, blithely disclaimed any such consequences caused by his
show: “Young interrogators don’t need our show. What the human mind can imagine is
so much greater than what we show on TV. No one needs us to tell them what to do. It’s
not like somebody goes, ‘Oh, look what they’re doing, I’ll do that.’ Is it?”334 But this
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appears to be precisely what General Finnegan was complaining of. Moreover, this
appears to be precisely what occurred at Guantánamo Bay. During meetings held in late
2002 to discuss new techniques for interrogating Guantánamo detainees, the participants
drew on various sources of inspiration, including personal experiences, and military
SERE training.335 According to Diane Beaver, the author of the Beaver memo,336 24 was
also a fount of ideas:
The first year of Fox TV’s dramatic series 24 came to a conclusion in
spring 2002, and the second year of the series began that fall. An
inescapable message of the program is that torture works. “We saw it on
cable,” Beaver recalled. “People had already seen the first series. It was
hugely popular.” Jack Bauer had many friends at Guantánamo, Beaver
added. “He gave people lots of ideas.” 337
B. Battlestar Galactica: Transcending the Science Fiction Genre
¶99

The re-imagined Battlestar Galactica, unlike its camp 1970s iteration, has received
critical acclaim.338 Much of this is due to its combination of quality acting, writing and
production values. Additionally, the show deals with issues that resonate in a post-9/11
world in a sophisticated manner. In addition to the episodes concerning torture, the show
has, for example, considered the tension between civilian and military authority, and the
limits of military necessity. Season 3, as discussed above, considered the morality of
suicide bombing in the context of resistance to alien/foreign occupation.339
¶100
The fact that Battlestar Galactica has a political edge that underlies the space
combat and the story of human survival has resulted in a kind of mainstreaming, as
indicated by a migration “from the fan boards to political blogs.”340 Thus, Battlestar
Galactica is now being discussed not simply as a work of science fiction, but as a show
that has contemporary resonance, and which raises real serious political, moral, and legal
issues.341 In particular, the show appears to have a certain following amongst legal
academics. Concurring Opinions, a well-known legal blog, featured an interview with cocreators Ron Moore and David Eick about various legal and moral issues raised by the
show.342 Other legal academics have discussed single episodes of Battlestar Galactica that
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raise legal issues such as the permissibility of genocide343 and the use of military
commissions.344
V. CONCLUSION
¶101

This article has discussed two contrasting narratives about torture. The first is
centered on the ticking bomb scenario and treats torture and coercion as a necessary tool
for saving lives. The ticking bomb’s logic has been expounded by various legal
academics since September 11, and was also evident in various Bush administration
documents and statements asserting the legality of torture and coercion. The second
narrative contests the usefulness of the ticking bomb scenario. Other academic
commentators have pointed out the numerous assumptions underlying the hypothetical
that are unlikely to be met in practice, as well as the broader costs of employing torture
and coercion. Certain government actors, notably the FBI and senior military lawyers,
opposed the use of torture and coercion for similar reasons.
¶102
These two conflicting accounts of torture have been reproduced in popular culture
as well. The ticking bomb scenario is at the heart of Fox’s 24, and it justifies Jack
Bauer’s frequent use of torture. After all, the clock is ticking, catastrophe will ensue
without heroic intervention, and torture works. Sci-Fi’s Battlestar Galactica by contrast,
presents a more skeptical view: torture and coercion spreads and corrupts, and above all,
does not reliably produce results.
¶103
Despite Jack Bauer fictional nature, he has been invoked in real-world discussions
about interrogation and national security issues surprisingly often. This is problematic
because, as argued above, 24’s portrayal of torture and interrogation is unrealistic in
many significant respects. Somewhat ironically, it is Battlestar Galactica, a science
fiction show set in outer space, which depicts torture and coercion in a way that is more
consistent with humanity’s historical experience. The era of the Bush administration has
of course passed, and President Obama has repudiated some of the most notorious
excesses of his predecessor’s counterterrorism policies.345 But should the issue of
interrogational torture and coercion arise again, particularly if the United States should
suffer a further terrorist attack in the future, rather than just asking what Jack Bauer
would do, perhaps we might also find wisdom in the words of the equally fictional
Commander William Adama: “It is not enough to survive; one has to be worthy of
surviving.”346
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